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The Failure of Export-Led Growth 
in Brazil and Mexico, c. 1870-1930 
Introduction 
The 1980s have witnessed a sharp reversal in the mainstream development 
doctrine in Latin America. The 'foreign trade scepticism' of the Prebish-ECLA 
doctrine, which prevailed in Latin America for nearly three decades, has given 
way to a new orthodoxy which postulates across-the-board trade liberalisation 
and the need to pursue an export-led growth path (Balassa, 1981; Sachs, 1985, 
1989). State intervention, protectionism and import substitution industrialisation 
are now seen as the roots of the recent debt crisis, widespread X-inefficiencies 
and a slowdown in economic growth. 
Curiously enough, the new mainstream doctrine shares with its predecessor 
a rather one-sided view of previous development experiences. Inspired largely 
by the dramatic repercussions of the world depression of the 1930s in Latin 
America, the Prebish-ECLA school attributed the failure of economic 
development in most of the region to the asymmetries of world trade for 
primary producing countries and to export-led growth. Likewise, the new 
orthodoxy - inspired by the development crisis of the 1980s - attributes such 
a failure to the previous development strategy which, in this case, is 
import-substitution industrialisation guided by state intervention. The problem 
with these opposite paradigms is that both fail to provide a balanced analysis 
of the advantages and disadvantages of import-substitution v. export-led growth 
strategies in different historical contexts. 
In this respect, the development process from the 1950s has recently received 
a more balanced treatment (Wells, 1987; Fanjzylber, 1990; Ocampo, 1990 and 
Sunkel, 1991). The pre-1930 period, however, remains little studied. This paper 
aims to fill this lacuna, focusing on the cases of Brazil and Mexico during the 
period between the early 1870s and the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
During that period, Brazil and Mexico, like many other Latin American 
countries, followed an export-led growth path which can be characterised as a 
relative failure. The unprecedented expansion of world trade during the period 
allowed new settlement countries such as the USA and Canada to achieve 
relatively high rates of per capita real GDP growth (around 2% per annum) and 
raise real wages and productivity to a point that enabled them to embark upon 
the 'virtuous circle' of economic development. In contrast, Brazil and Mexico, 
also large economies, well-endowed with natural resources, performed rather 
poorly: their per capita real GDP growth rates averaged about 0.9% and 1.2%,' 
respectively, and displayed marked cyclical instability. This was a binding 
constraint on rapid industrialisation in a way whose extent was, by 1929, rather 
limited (Fishlow, 1972; Suzigan, 1986; Cardenas, 1987; Haber, 1989).2 
In order to understand the process of economic development in these 
countries and some of its current problems, an analysis of the causes of such 
a failure is clearly important. Yet the existing literature on the topic is deficient 
in several respects. In the first place, there is a dearth of thorough statistical 
analysis of the determinants of exports in these countries. In the case of Brazil, 
for instance, the only detailed quantitative study on the topic is still Delfim 
Netto's classic work (1959) on coffee exports. This study, while discussing a 
number of factors which shaped coffee export cycles, does not provide a 
general econometric model to measure the relative importance of these factors 
and is mainly concerned with proving the deleterious effects of the coffee 
valorisation policies upon Brazil's competitiveness in the world coffee market. 
Systematic studies on other commodities are lacking.3 
There is also a lack of comprehensive work on the determinants of Mexico's 
exports. Rosenzweig's pioneering research (1960, 1965) on Mexico's exports 
during the Porfiriato is mainly descriptive. Moreover, it focuses on the role of 
international demand and the depreciation of the silver peso, while fails to 
consider a number of other important supply-side influences. The absence of 
a solid empirical analysis also plagues regional case studies on the development 
of certain export crops, such as sisal in Yucatan and coffee in Chiapas (Wells, 
1985; Joseph, 1986; Spenser, 1984). The only systematic attempt to measure 
the influence of relative price and other supply-side stimuli on Mexico's 
exports is that by Zabludowsky (1984). Yet, under the simplifying assumption 
of an infinitely elastic world demand for Mexico's exports, Zabludowsky 
overlooks potentially important demand-side influences. Furthermore, none of 
the studies mentioned above deal with the period of the Mexican revolution 
(1910-20) and its aftermath, on the assumption that there was a major 
discontinuity in exports and other economic trends during the Revolution - a 
fact which remains to be fully documented. 
As far as the impact of exports on the rest of the economy is concerned, the 
existing literature is contradictory. Furtado (1963) and Fishlow (1972), for 
instance, posit an inverse relationship between export growth and 
industrialisation in Brazil. In contrast, Dean (1969) and Suzigan (1986) contend 
that this relationship is a direct one. At the heart of this contradiction lies the 
the role played by relative price vis-a-vis income effects and the nature of the 
linkages of the export sector within the economy. The problem with these 
studies is that the former two concentrate on relative price effects, while the 
latter focus on income effects. A more balanced approach, which jointly 
considers price, income and linkage effects, is missing. Such an integrated 
analysis is also absent in the literature on Mexico. Although most authors 
contend that Mexico's economic performance before the revolution was highly 
responsive to export-led growth (Rosenzweig, 1965; Zabludowsky, 1984; Solis, 
1985), this is at variance with the evidence available. In fact, it has been shown, 
on the one hand, that a spurt in output growth and industrialisation took place 
in the 1890s (Haber, 1989; Catao, 1991) - a period during which exports did 
not grow more rapidly than before. On the other hand, the slowdown in 
domestic output growth and industrialisation in the 1900s was not accompanied 
by a slowdown in export growth (Catao, 1991). 
This paper addresses these issues in the light of new historical data. It 
provides an extensive statistical analysis of export performance and its 
macroeconomic repercussions in Brazil and Mexico during 1870-1930. 
Focusing on the differences between the supply-side structures of the Brazilian 
and the Mexican economies, I argue that the export growth-led growth failed 
not so much due to the slow growth and instability of international demand for 
some of their export commodities, but owing to a number of domestic structural 
factors peculiar to these countries. 
The paper is divided into four sections. Section I documents the growth 
patterns of Brazilian and Mexican exports. It shows, on the one hand, that 
Brazilian exports moved along a relatively slow growth trend and displayed 
marked cyclical instability. Mexico's exports, on the other hand, are shown to 
have grown much more rapidly overall and without displaying significant 
cyclical variations. 
Section II examines the causes of these trends and cycles. It presents a 
disaggregated analysis of the commodity composition of exports and then looks 
at both supply- and demand-side influences upon them. In this connection, I 
show that international demand and the domestic structure of these economies 
were both important to explain the observed export performance. This rules out 
a number of one-side views on pre-1930 export-led growth in Brazil and 
Mexico. 
Section III addresses the relationship between exports and domestic output 
growth. The size as well as the linkages of the export sector within the 
macroeconomy are then considered. Section III shows that the relatively slow 
growth of domestic real income in Brazil and its considerable instability over 
the 1870-1930 period were mainly due to the substantial backward linkages of 
her export sector. In contrast, the failure of export-led growth in Mexico - in 
spite of the rapid growth and stability of her exports - can be explained by the 
enclave nature of the country's export sector. 
Section IV concludes the paper by summarising its previous arguments and 
pointing out their relevance in the context of the existing literature. 
I. Describing Export Trends 
Graph 1 and table 1 both show that Brazilian export value displayed marked 
cyclical instability. Long swings of about 20 years length were a major feature 
of export growth during the period 1870-1912, with downswings in 1873-84 
and 1893-99 and upswings in 1884-93 and 1899-1912. As growth measures 
presented in table 1 indicate, the differencebetween the average growth rate in 
these downswings and the upswings (A gx) were dramatic.4 From the 1912 
peak onwards, such long swings are no longer observed. Between 1912 and 
1929, the pattern of export earnings was punctuated by marked short-term 
variations associated with the World War I shock and the boom-and-slump of 
1919-21. 
Graph 1 
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On the other hand, measures over longer periods indicate that the long-term 
growth trend of exports was relatively low. As shown in table 1, the value of 
Brazil's exports grew at only 2.9% p.a. during 1873-1912 and at 1.6% p.a. over 
1912-28. Thus, they lagged behind the expansion of world trade, the value of 
which grew 3.5% p.a. during 1880-1913 and 3.2% p.a. over 1913-29 (Lewis, 
1949, 1978). Brazil also fared much worse than other main primary producers. 
Argentina and Canada, for instance saw their exports expand at annual rates of 
6.1% and 4.2%, respectively, during 1873-1913 and at 4.9% and 7.6% in 
1913-28; Australian exports grew at 3.9% p.a. over 1913-1929.' 
Table 1 
Brazil: Growth Measures of Export Value (% per annum) 
gx A gx gx A gx 
Long-swing phases: Shorter periods: 
1873-1884 -1.7 - 1912-1914 -21.3 -
1884-1893 6.0 7.7 1914-1919 21.1 42.4 
1893-1899 -3.7 -9.6 1919-1921 -36.7 -57.8 
1899-1912 8.7 12.4 Longer periods: 
1912-1919 7.0 -1.7 1873-1912 2.9 -
1919-1928 -2.4 -9.4 1912-1928 1.6 -1.3 
Source: IBGE (1987, pp. 523-4). 
Similar conclusions hold for the volume of Brazilian exports (table 2). 
Although considerably less volatile,6 its overall growth rate was low in relative 
terms. During 1872-1913, for instance, Brazilian exports grew at 3.4% p.a., 
while Argentine and Canadian exports grew at 5.2% and 4.0% p.a. The gap is 
even larger for the period 1913/14-1928: Argentine and Canadian exports 
expanded at rates of 5.5% and 6.8% p.a. over that time, whereas Brazil did not 
exceed a meagre 2.2% growth rate.7 
Table 2 
Brazil: Growth Measures of the Export Quantum (% per annum) 
gx A g x gx A g x 
Long-swing phases: Shorter periods: 
1872-1883 2.1 - 1913-1914 -11 .0 -
1883-1892 1.5 -0.6 1914-1919 7.0 -4.0 
1892-1901 6.8 5.3 1919-1921 -5.1 -12.1 
1901-1913 0.7 -6.1 Longer periods: 
1913-1919 3.8 3.1 1873-1912 3.4 -
1919-1931 0.8 -3.0 1912-1928 2.2 -1.2 
Source: IBGE (1987, pp. 551-3). 
In sharp contrast with the Brazilian experience, Mexico's export earnings 
grew rapidly through 1883-1912/38 without displaying long-swing variations, 
as we can see from graph 2 and table 3.9 Although short-period measures 
reveal some degree of cyclical instability during certain sub-periods, in overall 
terms Mexico's exports also fared quite well in this regard: the coefficient of 
variation of exports for the pre-World War I period is only 1.49 for Mexico, 
whereas for Canada it is 2.15, for Argentina 2.63 and for Brazil 3.56.10 
Graph 2 
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The impressive growth performance of Mexico's exports before World War 
I stands out even more clearly when the quantum indicator is considered (table 
4). The average growth rate of 7.2% and the absence of major cyclical 
instability for the period 1878-1911 is no doubt outstanding by any 
international standards. During World War I and the Mexican Revolution, an 
absolute decline is observed up to 1917, but this was followed by a sharp 
recovery. Hence the average growth rate for the period 1911-21 as a whole was 
not substantially lower than that for 1883-1911. Only from 1921 onwards did 
a persistent downswing in export volume take place. 
Table 3 
Mexico: Growth Measures of Export Value (% per annum) 
g x A g x gx A g x 
Long-swing phases: Shorter periods: 
1883-1892 4.1 - 1900-1906 9.7 -
1892-1900 4.6 0.5 1906-1912 3.0 -6.7 
1900-1912 6.3 1.7 1912-1915 -3.5 -6.5 
1912-1920 13.4 7.1 1915-1920 25.0 28.5 
1920-1928 -4.9 -18.5 Longer periods: 
1883-1912 4.8 -
1912-1928 3.7 -1.1 
Source: Catao (1991, pp. 231-2). 
Table 4 
Mexico: Growth Measures of the Export Quantum (% per annum) 
g x A g x gx A g x 
Long-swing phases: 
1883-1892 6.4 
Shorter periods: 
1900-1906 7.3 
1892-1900 7.7 1.3 1906-1911 7.6 0.3 
1900-1911 7.4 -0.3 1911-1917 -4.4 -12.0 
1911-1921 5.5 -1.9 1917-1921 22.2 26.6 
1921-1928 -2.8 -8.3 Longer periods: 
1883-1911 
1911-1928 
7.2 
2.0 -5.2 
Source: Catao (1991, pp. 233-4). 
In short the evidence of this section leaves us with two main questions. First, 
what accounted for the slow growth and instability of Brazil's exports 
compared with other primary producing countries? Secondly, why did the 
Mexican economy as a whole grow much slower than its exports? We shall 
now turn to these questions. 
II. Explaining Export Trends 
Brazil 
Tables 5 and 6 show how Brazilian exports were very little diversified in terms 
of both commodity composition and export markets: throughout 1870-1939 
overall export growth relied crucially on the performance of coffee exports to 
the US market. 
Table 5 
Brazil: Commodity Composition of Exports (% of value in current price) 
Coffee Cotton Rubber Sugar Others Total 
1870-79 56.3 9.6 5.2 12.8 17.1 100 
1880-89 64.1 3.6 5.6 10.0 16.7 100 
1890-99 67.8 2.4 8.3 6.2 15.3 100 
1900-09 59.0 3.5 19.6 3.8 14.1 100 
1910-19 62.4 1.4 15.1 1.1 20.0 100 
1920-29 71.5 0.9 1.5 0.5 25.6 100 
1930-39 42.3 18.9 1.5 0.0 37.3 100 
Source: IBGE (1941, pp. 89-90). 
TABLE 6 
Brazil: Geographical Distribution of Exports (% of value in current price) 
UK USA Germany France Others Total 
1870-79 27.0 32.1 1.6' 8.5 24.8 100 
1880-89 22.2 43.6 12.1" 9.4 12.7 100 
1890-99 11.8 45.2 16.6 8.8 17.6 100 
1900-09 14.3 35.2 13.3 7.6 29.6 100 
1910-19 12.8 40.0 6.7 12.6 27.9 100 
1920-29 6.2 46.5 8.7 12.0 26.6 100 
1930-39 9.0 39.9 12.6 7.8 30.7 100 
1872-73 ** obtained by interpolation 
Sources: computed from Gongalves (1982, p. 48) and IBGE (1987, pp. 526-8). 
Because of the high contribution made by coffee in total exports, this section 
will concentrate on the demand and supply influences on the coffee sector. The 
role of other main export products such as cotton, rubber and sugar will also be 
considered, though in much less detail, at the end of this section. 
Most of Brazil's coffee exports went to the USA." Hence, the growth and 
fluctuations in US national income had a clear impact on Brazil's coffee 
exports. In fact, as graph 3 and table 7 both show, the price and value of 
Brazil's coffee exports followed long swings with the same timing as those of 
US national output: a downswing in 1873-83, an upswing to 1891, a downswing 
in 1891-99 and the 1899-1906 upswing; only between 1906 and 1912 did this 
positive correlation break down, with coffee prices rising substantially between 
the peaks of 1906 and 1912, whereas US national output underwent a 
downswing.12 A positive correlation between long swings in coffee prices and 
those in US real income is again observed throughout 1912-1937. 
Graph 3 
Source: prices - Delfim Netto (1959, pp. 245-6); quantum - IBGE (1987, p. 312). 
Table 7 also highlights two phenomena: on the one hand, it shows that 
variations in coffee prices and revenues were far larger than the amplitude of 
output swings observed for the USA; on the other hand, the above measures 
indicate that the average growth of the coffee export quantum over 1873-1937 
was considerably inferior to that of US real income. This suggests that a 
substantial part of the growth and fluctuations in coffee exports cannot be 
explained by international demand; supply-side factors must also be considered. 
Table 7 
Growth Measures of World Coffee Price and of the Value of Brazil's 
Coffee Exports (%) 
gp gq §ous 
1873-83 -7.0 1873-83 6.1 1873-82 4.0 
1883-91 10.0 1883-92 1.7 1882-92 5.3 
1891-1900 -12.7 1892-1901 7.6 1892-99 3.1 
1900-12 5.7 1901-13 -0.8 1899-1906 5.1 
1912-29 2.3 1913-31 1.7 1906-12 3.1 
1912-29 3.1 
1873-1929 0.1 1873-1931 2.7 1873-1929 3.8 
Sources: gp = average geometric growth rate of world coffee prices in US$, 
as from Delfim-Netto (1959, pp. 245-6); gq = average geometric growth rate 
of the export quantum according to IBGE (1987, pp. 312); gous = average 
growth rate of US real GDP, as from Solomou (1987, p. 49) and Maddison 
(1982, pp. 173-4). 
Coffee production presents three outstanding features. First, a coffee grove 
does not bear its first commercial crop until its fourth or fifth year.13 Its 
productivity reaches an apex when the tree is around ten years old; then, the 
coffee tree continues to bear fruit with declining productivity for thirty to forty 
years more (Laerne, 1885, pp. 296-7; Wellman, 1961, pp. 145-51: Holloway, 
1975, p. 8).14 
A second important feature of coffee production is the substantial amount of 
fixed investment required on land clearing and planting. According to Rowe's 
estimates (1932, pp. 41-5), fixed costs account for about 75% of total 
production costs. Thirdly, a tree with ripening berries must be harvested if its 
life expectancy is not to be shortened considerably (Holloway, 1975, p. 13). 
This requirement, together with the outstanding importance of fixed costs 
relative to harvesting costs, means that the producer's optimal response is 
invariably to harvest the current crop, notwithstanding declines in price. Hence, 
no significant correlation between current price and current output of coffee is 
expected. 
The point to be made here is that these structural characteristics alone, under 
free market conditions, give rise to cycles of coffee prices with a similar length 
as the long swing. In order to show this, consider the coffee supply function 
Equation 4 
where Y* stands for income in the main coffee consuming countries.18 
Substitution effects need not be considered insofar as goods such as tea are 
highly imperfect substitutes for coffee. The term 'TREND' accounts for factors 
such as population growth, the rise in overseas competition and life cycle 
effects, whereas e accounts for erratic demand shocks. 
Equation 3 
where e, tr, Pc* and Pa* stand, respectively, for the mil-reis/US$ exchange rate, 
the transportation cost ratio between the coffee producer and the consumer, the 
world coffee price in US$ and the world price of those primary products that 
constitute alternative possibilities of investment for the coffee producer - which 
in the case of Brazil was cotton. 
The world coffee demand can be represented by the following demand 
function: 
Equation 2 
Substituting Equation 2 back into Equation 1 and assuming that price 
expectations are static,17 that producers are capable of holding stocks for a 
period t and that perfect arbitrage holds, we have 
Equation 1 
where Ct, (|)(i) and vt stand, respectively, for the number of coffee trees planted 
during the period t, the average productivity of these trees and random shocks, 
including weather variations.15 The investment function Ct is a function of the 
expected coffee price and the price of coffee ('Pc') relative to that of 
alternative cultures ('Pa'),16 i.e., 
Equation 7U 
Although there do not exist any precise estimates of p, or <|> for the 
pre-World War II period, reasonable guesses can be made. As regards the 
A reduced form estimate of the world coffee price can be obtained by 
equating Equation 3 and Equation 4 Solving for the market clearing price of 
coffee we obtain the following expression: 
Equation 5 
Under free market conditions, the homogeneous solution of Equation 5 gives 
us the cyclical instability generated by the gestation lag in coffee supply. 
Letting yl=y2=y3=tr=p2=^ =^=0 and e = l, it follows that 
Equation 6 
Thus, the problem is reduced to one of unilateral dynamic coupling, 
originally discussed by Goodwin (1947). Since the average productivity of a 
coffee tree follows a slowly changing path, it is reasonable to assume that (|)(i) 
- <))(i-l). Recalling that (|)(40) = 0 by assumption, we can lag Equation 6 one 
time period, subtract it from Equation 6 and re-arrange it, so as to get 
Equation 7 
Another way of obtaining a simplified equation, also similar to Equation 7, 
is to disregard the slight rise in the productivity of the coffee tree between its 
fifth and tenth year of life. Instead, it can be assumed that the productivity of 
the coffee tree reaches its peak when the tree is five years old and then declines 
according to a geometric progression.19 In this case, where (j)(i) can be written 
as ku', the resulting equation is as follows 
parameter p,, note that it corresponds to the absolute value of the price 
elasticity of supply of coffee divided by its price elasticity of demand. The 
world demand for coffee possesses a very low price-elasticity - something in 
the range of 0.2 to 0.5, according to econometric works dealing with the 
post-1940 period (Delfim Netto, 1959, p. 201; Parikh, 1974, p. 40; Ford, 1978, 
p. 119). With reference to price supply elasticity, it has been suggested that it 
was about 0.5 for the pre-1906 period (Delfim Netto, 1959, p. 19). On the other 
hand, OLS estimates to be provided below suggest a price supply elasticity of 
0.3. So, a figure in the range of 0.3 to 0.5 is representative. 
Undertaking simulations of Equation 7 for values of p ranging from 2.0 to 
0.8 and supposing a productivity function (|)(i) with various different shapes, 
coffee prices displayed cycles of 14 to 16 years length. 
The simulation results also show that the higher the supply price elasticity 
relative to demand, the larger the amplitude but the lower the cyclical period. 
This has a clear intuitive explanation: for a given increase in supply, ceteris 
paribus, prices have to drop substantially so as to make demand equal to 
supply; the lower the demand price elasticity, the sharper the price fall must be. 
On the other hand, if coffee tree productivity evolves along a more pronounced 
downward trend, the lower the cyclical period and the lower the cyclical 
amplitude. In any case, the cyclical period remains within 14-16 years under 
realistic assumptions about the parameters' value. 
The above simulations therefore show that long swings in coffee prices may 
be caused by a once-and-for-all shock upon our structural model. Clearly, 
income fluctuations in the core countries are a major source of such shocks. If 
income fluctuations in the core countries (Yt) display a similar cyclical 
periodicity and phase as given by the homogeneous solution pchl, a price cycle 
of that periodicity but of higher amplitude will emerge.20 The evidence 
presented in both graph 3 and table 7 supports the hypothesis that these supply 
and demand influences were both present. 
Yet our analysis would be incomplete if it did not give an account of other 
factors that may have either enhanced or reduced the growth and fluctuations 
of world coffee prices. Since Brazil's coffee production accounted for 50% to 
70% of world supply, variations in local weather conditions, exchange rates, 
transportation costs and stock policy all had major repercussions on the world 
price of coffee and consequently on Brazil's export earnings. 
The influence of weather shocks on Brazilian coffee production during some 
years (e.g. 1870, 1886, 1902 and 1918) is acknowledged in the literature 
(Delfim Netto, 1959, passim; Pelaez, 1971, p. 67). However, no attention has 
been paid to climatic shock as a possible cause of cyclical variations in coffee 
prices. Given the propagation mechanism, a once-and-for-all weather shock is 
capable of generating cycles in production and prices, as Frisch (1933) has 
demonstrated. Besides, there exists evidence about the existence of climatic 
cycles of some 20 years length (Lamb, 1982), which may themselves generate 
long swings. In the British case, for example, agricultural long swings were 
generated inter alia by climatic changes throughout 1856-1913 (Solomou, 1987, 
pp. 122-3). As regards Brazil, it is likely that such systematic climatic 
variations were partly smoothed by the rapid expansion of the agricultural 
frontier. This is, however, a hypothesis that needs to be carefully tested based 
on metereological data available in primary data sources, a task which is 
beyond the scope of the present work. 
That variations in the Brazilian exchange rate influenced world coffee prices 
with some five year lag is clear from equation 5. However, the value of the 
exchange rate is not a purely exogenous factor. As discussed elsewhere (Catao, 
1991), the exchange rate is, inter alia, a positive function of coffee prices. 
Throughout 1870-1930, export earnings were highly correlated with coffee 
export prices. So, on the one hand, rising export revenues lead to exchange rate 
appreciation, ceteris paribus. In other words, as Pc is high in equation 7, the 
level of e is low, so that the impact of past coffee prices (Pct.j) on the current 
price (Pct) is attenuated. Hence exchange rate variations caused by fluctuations 
in coffee prices played a counter-cyclical role. 
On the other hand, however, this exchange rate mechanism had a major 
negative effect on the long-term growth of Brazil's overall exports. By keeping 
the domestic coffee price high during periods of falling world prices, such 
counter-cyclical variations of the exchange rate contributed to a faster growth 
of supply relative to the world demand for coffee in the long-run. Hence, the 
stagnant trend of world coffee prices between 1873 and 1929 (table 7). Also, 
by keeping the price of coffee high relative to that of other domestic crops, this 
mechanism reinforced the monocrop character of Brazilian agricultural 
production. This is clearly at variance with claims that the Brazilian coffee 
market worked efficiently before the post-1906 policy interventions 
(Delfim-Netto, 1959, p. 44). 
The other important influence on coffee exports was the long-term decline 
in transportation costs. Ocean freight rates, for instance, displayed a downward 
trend between the early 1870s and the beginning of World War I, only 
interrupted by erratic short-term fluctuations (North, 1958, p. 554). Although 
freight rates added some 8% to 18% to the FOB price of Brazilian coffee,21 
it appears that their variations had a minor influence on the cyclical pattern of 
international coffee prices.22 Besides not displaying long cycles, variations in 
ocean freight rates were relatively mild when compared with those of coffee 
prices. Not surprisingly, therefore, the correlation coefficient between the two 
is very low, 0.38. 
The influence of domestic transport costs, however, was much more 
pronounced. Their importance has been duly underlined by contemporaries, as 
a thorough report on the Brazilian coffee sector reveals: 
'The costs of transport are so heavy that many fazenderos in the far interior have 
to keep up with their inferior crops, so as not to lower the selling price. (. . .) It 
is almost incredible, and yet it is a fact that the transport of this coffee by water 
to Rio costs more than the transport to New York or to any part of Europe' 
(Laerne, 1885, pp. 225 and 332). 
In this sense, the expansion of the domestic railway system after the late 
1860s provided a major boost to Brazilian coffee production and exports. 
Through a dramatic reduction in transportation costs, the expansion of 
railways raised the profit margins of existing coffee producers and at the same 
time enabled new coffee producers to enter the market (Dean, 1976, pp. 40-4; 
Mattoon Jr., 1977, pp. 285-6). During most of the 1870-1930 period, long 
swings in railway mileage in Brazil coincided with those of world coffee prices 
(also displaying upswings in the late 1880s, the 1900s and the 1920s); thus 
railway construction reinforced the long-term instability of Brazil's coffee 
exports. Moreover, railways contributed to cyclical instability of Brazil's coffee 
exports through variations in the rail freight rates. Because of Brazil's lack of 
coal and the underdeveloped stage of her producer goods industry, the railways 
were dependent on imported coal and components which contributed 
significantly to operational costs. Therefore, most railway companies indexed 
their freight rates to the value of the exchange rate (Ducan, 1932, p. 10). As the 
latter appreciated during periods of high coffee prices, freight rates were then 
lower; thus, the planters' profit margins were higher and production was 
fostered. The opposite occurred during periods of low coffee prices. 
As regards its longer-term contribution to export-led growth, the expansion 
of the railway network in Brazil was modest in relative terms. Argentina and 
Mexico, also large export-economies with a rather small railway network by the 
early 1870s, saw their lines expand at rates of 8.7% and 9.4% p.a., respectively, 
between 1873 and 1913.24 The corresponding figure for Brazil is 7.8%. A 
better comparative indicator, however, is the ratio of railway kms/thousand 
inhabitants. While in Argentina it stood at 4.2, in Canada at 5.7 and Australia 
at 6.5 by the early 1910s, the respective ratio for Brazil is only 1.0. Therefore 
the relatively slow expansion of Brazil's transportation system also accounted 
for the poor growth performance of her exports. 
Graph 4 
B R A Z I L : P R I C E O F C O F F E E R E L A T I V E TO THE 
C O T T O N P R I C E , 1 8 7 0 - 1 9 5 0 
Source: Coffee prices from Delfim Netto (1959, pp. 245-6); cotton prices from the US 
Department of Commerce (1975, pp. 207-9). 
Turning to the importance of relative price effects, there existed a possibility 
for the agriculturalist to substitute cotton for coffee during periods when the 
latter's price fell below the price of cotton. In fact, graph 4 indicates that 
throughout 1870-1950 long downswings in coffee prices were correlated with 
downswings in the price of coffee relative to cotton. However, it appears that 
such a cross elasticity of supply was minimal. Its value cannot be estimated 
econometrically because of the absence of indicators of cotton production 
before 1900; but case studies have shown that very few coffee producers 
actually shifted substantial resources towards the cotton culture (Canabrava, 
1951). In fact, until the 1900s, cotton in Brazil remained as a poor man's 
culture in spite of the rapid growth of the world demand for cotton during the 
period (Brazil, 1908-1909, p. 185). This was due not only to the American 
comparative advantage - which certainly kept the profit margin from growing 
cotton in Brazil much lower than that from coffee - but also to a lack of 
institutional support for the domestic producer (Canabrava, 1951). Only when 
a systematic governmental policy of technological development and financial 
support for the producer was undertaken in the late 1910s and 1920s did large 
scale cotton production begin to emerge (Pelaez, 1971, p. 173-86). Yet due to 
the success of the coffee valorisation policies in the 1920s and the low base it 
started from, the share of cotton in the total value of Brazilian exports by 1929 
still stood at a meagre 0.9% (IBGE, 1941, pp. 87, 90). Hence the rapid growth 
of cotton production from 1910s was filtered out in terms of the aggregate 
export performance. 
In sum, simulations of the coffee price equation as well as empirical 
qualitative considerations suggest that before the introduction of the post-1906 
stock policies, the growth and fluctuations in coffee prices were mainly 
determined by variations in the US national output and in domestic railway 
mileage, supply lags and weather shocks. This is in fact supported by a 
dynamic specification of equation 5, which yields the following OLS estimates 
for the 1870-1906 period (all variables in logs, t-ratios in brackets):25 
Equation 8 
R2=0.87; DW=1.66; Normality: Xsq (2)=2A 1; Heterocedasticity: Xsq (1)=3.06 
Equation 9 
R2=0.89: DW=1.84; Normality:Xsq (2)=0.91; Heterocedasticity: Xsq (1)=0.00 
As expected, the world price of coffee proved to be highly elastic to 
fluctuations in the US real GDP, followed by its five-year lagged value and 
then by its one-year lagged value.26 Also in line with the qualitative evidence 
discussed above, the rail transportation cost proxy - Arail - proved to be 
significant in explaining coffee prices, whereas ocean freight costs and the 
coffee/cotton relative price did not and were thus dropped from the equation. 
Finally, the coffee export quantum appears to have been mainly determined by 
lagged domestic coffee prices. 
Having examined the main determinants of pre-1906 coffee export trends, 
the role of post-1906 stock policies in the coffee market needs now to be 
discussed. These are relevant when explaining both the 1906-12 price upswing 
- when US income and imports underwent a Kuznets downswing - and the 
stagnation of the coffee export quantum from World War I onwards. The coffee 
supply control policies have been extensively studied in the Brazilian 
historiography (Tauney, 1939; Delfim-Netto, 1959; Pelaez, 1971; Fishlow, 
1972; Holloway, 1975; Silber, 1977; Fritsch, 1988). It is not the purpose of this 
work to analyse the short-run macroeconomic impact of those policies but, 
rather, to put them into a long-term growth framework. 
Until 1906, producers' supply decisions were decentralised and the size of 
regulating stocks held by American and European trading houses were too 
small to influence prices significantly over a period longer than one or two 
years. Thus supply and demand were brought into line largely through price 
variations. Between 1907 and 1912, however, the Brazilian government 
embarked upon a grand scale policy of holding coffee stocks. This first 
'valorisation policy' was quite effective: world coffee prices rose considerably 
in spite of the 1907-12 downswing in the American economy. There followed 
another episodic intervention in the coffee market during 1917-18. From 1922 
onwards the valorisation programme was carried out on a permanent basis, 
leading to a threefold rise in the domestic stock of coffee trees between 1922 
and 1929,27 while effective supply was kept constant. 
From a long-term perspective, the evidence put forward in graph 3 and in 
table 7 suggests that the outcome of the Brazilian valorisation policies was 
mixed. Such policies were by no means the basic cause of long swings in prices 
and certainly avoided a major price downturn during 1907-12. A positive 
influence on world coffee prices was also achieved by controlling supply in the 
1920s. However, by keeping coffee prices artificially high, the valorisation 
policy of the 1920s led to an overexpansion of coffee plantations during a 
period when world demand for coffee was faltering. As these investments in 
coffee plantations matured, when real income in the core countries fell 
dramatically, the valorisation policy of the 1920s largely contributed to the 
dramatic downswing in coffee prices and in Brazil's export earnings in the 
1930s. In short, in spite of their positive role during some sub-periods, the 
coffee valorisation policies failed to prevent Brazilian coffee exports from 
being highly vulnerable to the fluctuations stemming from the US economy 
throughout 1912-1937.28 
* * * 
Having highlighted the main supply and demand factors behind the growth 
and fluctuations of coffee exports, we now turn to the contribution of other 
commodities to the overall pattern of Brazil's exports. Since the case of cotton 
has already been discussed in connection with that of coffee, I shall focus on 
sugar and rubber exports. 
The quantity and value of Brazil's sugar exports underwent a pronounced 
secular decline from the early 1860s. Although the rise of European beet sugar 
production partly accounts for this, its main causes lie with domestic structural 
factors. It has been shown that the abundance of land, cheap labour and chronic 
scarcity of credit greatly hindered the pace of technological progress in the 
sector (Einsenberg, 1974, pp. 41-50). Although the government's subsidy policy 
from the 1880s fostered the introduction of central sugar mills and thereby of 
more advanced production methods, this was of limited extent and often led to 
inefficient resource allocation (ibid., pp. 88-106, 220-1). In contrast, Brazil's 
main competitors in the world sugar market, such as Cuba, counted on 
abundant capital, scarce labour and, in some instances, richer land (ibid., pp. 
217-9). Compared to them, the Brazilian sugar industry remained 
technologically backward. 
An indicator of the outstanding importance of technological backwardness 
in explaining the secular decline of Brazil's sugar exports is provided in table 
8. Whereas cane-sugar had its share in the world market reduced by one and 
half times between the early 1870s and the late 1890s, Brazil's world market 
share underwent a fourfold reduction during the same period. After the 1890s, 
on the other hand, cane-sugar increased its share in world markets; yet the 
Brazilian share continued to fall. Exchange rate depreciation and the expansion 
of domestic railway services towards the sugar producing areas seem to have 
had a minor effect on the international competitiveness of Brazilian sugar; deep 
structural problems prevailed. 
Table 8 
Brazil: Sugar Export Quantum, Share in World Sugar Production and 
Share of Sugar-Cane in World Sugar Production (%) 
Source: Eisenberg (1974, p. 20). 
1871-75 1876-80 1881-5 1886-90 1891-5 1896-1900 1901-5 
Xq 161.1 146.3 217.1 143.7 153.3 113.2 78.3 
Br/Wo 5.7 5.3 5.3 2.8 2.1 1.4 0.8 
Beet/Cane 40.0 44.2 51.2 56.5 52.0 61.0 50.0 
Supply-side influences also played a prominent role in the case of rubber. 
The rubber tree (Hervea Brasiliensis) is a typical specie of the Amazon rain 
forest. Its abundance and the availability of cheap labour enabled Brazilian 
rubber exports to rise rapidly between the early 1890s and World War I in 
response to the invention of rubber tyres by Dunlop in 1888 and the ensuing 
rise in rubber demand by the transportation industry in the core countries 
(Santos, 1980, pp. 200-3). Yet Brazilian rubber trees in the Amazon had long 
been subject to leaf-attacking fungi that rendered large plantation tracts with a 
yield unacceptably low for commercial exploitation (Dean, 1987, pp. 53-66). 
This problem, together with rising world rubber prices, induced rubber 
cultivation elsewhere, most notably in Southern Asia. Southern Asian 
plantations were highly successful both in getting rid of the Amazon-native 
fungi and in developing new plantation methods. As a result, the Brazilian 
monopolistic position in the world rubber market was gradually eroded. This 
is shown in table 9. 
Table 9 
Brazil: Share in World Rubber Market (%) and Volume of Rubber 
Exports 
1890 1900 1912 1919 1929 
Br/World — 53.3 43.6 8.1 3.4 
Xq (103 tons) 15.3 24.3 42.3 33.2 19.8 
Sources: Santos (1980, p. 230); export quantum figures from IBGE (1941, pp. 
86-87). 
By the end of World War I Brazilian rubber had lost a substantial part of its 
stake in the world market. The loss of competitiveness of Brazilian rubber 
persisted through the inter-war period. This was no doubt the main reason 
behind the marked decline in the rubber export quantum. The worldwide 
oversupply brought about by World War I and the slowdown in the 
international demand for most primary products further contributed to the 
downswing.29 
To sum up, the dramatic long swings in price and the slow growth of the 
quantum of Brazilian total exports during 1870-1913 were largely due to the 
performance of coffee exports. Other important export items, such as sugar and 
rubber, reinforced these trends during specific sub-periods - namely, during the 
export downswing of the 1870s and the export upswing of the 1900s, 
respectively. Both supply- and demand-side factors were shown to account for 
the observed growth pattern of coffee exports. In the cases of sugar, rubber and 
cotton, supply-side influences played a prominent role. 
Mexico 
Although remaining extremely dependent on the US market throughout 
1870-1940, Mexico's exports underwent dramatic diversification. As shown in 
table 10, the importance of silver exports had been waning since the late 1870s 
at the same time as the exports of agricultural and non-precious metals had 
increased their share in total exports. 
Table 10 
Mexico: Composition of the Export Bill by Main Products (% of Current 
Values) 
Silver Sisal Coffee Copper Lead Oil Others Total 
1877-80 72.6 7.0 5.8 — — _ 14.6 100 
1880-89 68.2 12.3 5.8 0.7 - - 13.0 100 
1890-99 55.0 11.7 6.0 3.9 1.0 - 22.5 100 
1900-10 38.7 10.7 4.5 9.0 2.4 15.5 19.2 100 
1920-29 14.7 5.0 3.1 5.6 6.4 42.0 23.2 100 
1930-39 15.8 4.6 3.9 4.9 9.8 15.5 45.5 100 
Sources: Mitchell (1983, pp. 621 and 623), except for the value of sisal exports 
which is from Martinez et al (1976, pp. 273-5). 
Table 11 
Mexico: Geographic Distribution of Exports (% of Total Value) 
USA UK Germany France Others Total 
1880-89 56.7 31.2 3.8 8.1 0.2 100 
1890-99 74.5 13.6 3.9 3.8 4.2 100 
1900-10 74.0 11.3 5.6 2.9 6.2 100 
1920-29 69.8 6.5 3.7 2.1 17.9 100 
1930-39 61.6 11.1 7.6 2.6 17.1 100 
Sources: El Colegio de Mexico (1960a, pp. 532-54) and Mitchell (1983, pp. 
567, 576, 586). 
Thus, a thorough analysis of the overall export pattern requires a separate 
discussion of the case of each export item. Let us begin by considering the case 
of silver. The long-term decline in the world price of silver, observed in graph 
5, was caused by the worldwide productivity rise in silver mining relative to 
gold, the worldwide spread of the gold standard and the falling demand for 
silver coins from the eastern empires, and random discoveries (Cosio Villegas, 
1965, p. 205; Torres Gaytan, 1988, pp. 241-3). 
It is striking, however, to observe from graph 5 and table 12 a rapid growth 
of the silver export quantum between 1873 and 1913 - a period of falling 
prices. The reasons for the phenomenon should be sought on the supply side. 
Since Mexico remained on the silver standard during 1870-1904, the secular 
fall in the price of silver relative to gold (and therefore relative to the dollar or 
the pound) was accompanied by a proportional exchange rate depreciation. The 
negative effects of a fall in the international price of silver upon production 
were made up for by the depreciation of the peso. As money wages and other 
variable costs lagged behind the exchange rate and technical progress in the 
sector underwent rapid change, domestic production was fostered (Pletcher, 
1958; Bernstein, 1965, pp. 29-30). Moreover, the tariff structure prevailing 
throughout 1870-1913 provided mining enterprises with the benefit of 
importing explosives and mining machinery free of duty or any sort of 
quantitative restrictions.30 
Graph 5 
h C X I C O : P R I C E AND Q U A N T U M O F 
S I L V E R E X P O R T S , 1 8 7 0 - 1 9 5 0 
Source: US$ silver prices from the US Department of Commerce (1975: 606); quantum 
exports by dividing the value of silver exports by the US$ silver price. The 1913-18 
value of silver exports were obtained by interpolation based on the value of Mexico's 
silver exports to the US, taken from US Trade Statistics, 1913-18 issues. 
Table 12 
Mexico: Growth Rates of Silver Export Quantum 
g 
1873-1880 
1880-1891 
1891-1900 
1900-1911 
1911-1921 
1921-1926 
1926-1937 
1873-1926 
4.6 
4.4 
5.3 
2.7 
-2.3 
9.7 
-0.7 
3.4 
Source: as for graph 5. 
Finally, the expansion of the railway network from the late 1870s onwards 
brought about a substantial reduction of transportation costs to Mexico's mining 
sector (Bernstein, 1965, pp. 32-3). Whereas the average freight rate by rail in 
1900 was 0.019 peso/km, that by wagon shipment (the nearest substitute for 
railways) varied between 0.104 and 0.146 (Coatsworth, 1981, p. 94 and p. 103). 
As graph 11 shows, apart from sharp short-term fluctuations in the 
mid-1880s and mid-1890s, railway lines expanded rapidly through 1873-1912 
(g=9.4%p.a.). As such, it contributed significantly to the rapid secular growth 
of the quantum of silver exports. 
Under the shelter of all the aforementioned supply side stimuli domestic 
production soared: between 1873 and 1911 the quantum of silver exports 
actually grew at a 4.1% annual rate in spite of the continuous fall in the 
international price. 
After 1912, the pattern of silver exports was shaped by diverse exogenous 
shocks. The Mexican revolution no doubt had a disruptive impact upon silver 
production during 1911-1921, although its negative effects were mainly due to 
the interruption in railway services rather than to the destruction of the sector's 
productive capacity (Bernstein, 1965, p. 104). In the second place, disruptions 
in world trade associated with World War I also had a negative impact: the 
European supply of cyanide - a fundamental input for the modern process of 
separation of the silver from the respective ore - was cut down without being 
compensated for by the American supply (ibid., p. 102). Yet, due partly to the 
contraction of Mexico's silver exports and partly to the overshooting of the 
international demand for silver during World War I and its immediate 
aftermath, silver prices rocketed. As a result, there was actually a rise in the 
US$ value of Mexico's silver exports during the revolution (4.3% p.a. between 
1912 and 1920). 
Graph 6 
h e x I C O : A C C R E T I O N S TO THE 
R A I L W A Y S Y S T E M , 1 8 7 5 - 1 9 1 2 
Source: M i t c h e l l ( 1 9 8 3 , pp. 6 5 6 - 8 ) . 
In the early 1920s, a sharp recovery in silver output and the export quantum 
was observed as a result of the idle capacity accumulated during the 
revolutionary disruptions, the reconstruction of railway lines destroyed during 
the revolution and the diffusion of a new extraction technique of 4 ore flotation' 
(Bernstein, 1965, p. 127; pp. 137-42). Only after 1926 were these supply-side 
stimuli counteracted by the worldwide return to the gold standard from the 
mid-1920s onwards and the ensuing fall in the international demand for silver. 
Such a demand slowdown, combined with increasing world production,31 led 
to a decline in world silver prices and in Mexico's silver earnings. 
Turning to henequen or sisal, this became a fibre in high demand by the US 
cordage industry from the 1870s. After being imported from Mexico, the raw 
hemp was converted into binder twine and then sold to American grain farmers 
(Wells, 1985, p. 30). Thus, under a highly elastic supply, the demand for 
Mexican henequen would tend to move in line with US agricultural production. 
Yet, as graph 7 shows, the price and the quantum of henequen exports 
displayed major long-term fluctuations in relation to those of US agricultural 
output.32 The main reasons for the observed fluctuations should be sought in 
both supply lags and the price elasticity of demand. 
The henequen tree takes about seven or eight years to produce its first 
commercial crop. Under free market conditions,33 such a supply lag itself can 
generate long cycles. Similar to that shown for coffee, the length of the 
henequen cycle depends on the price elasticities of supply and demand. 
Unfortunately, no quantitative information about these price elasticities or about 
the productivity function of the henequen tree is available. Although this 
precludes us from simulating the cyclical behaviour of henequen prices and 
output, some qualitative considerations shed a good deal of light on the causes 
of fluctuations in henequen exports. 
Graph 7 points out the inverse relationship between price and quantum 
during most of the period.34 This suggests that supply lags were no doubt 
important in generating cycles in henequen prices. 
Graph 7 
M E X I C O : Q U A N T U M AND PRICE OF 
H E N E Q U E N E X P O R T S , 1 8 7 0 - 1 9 4 0 
Sources: henequen export figures for 1873-7 from Martinez et al (1976: 273); 1877-
1910 figures from El Colegio de Mexico (1960a, p. 390); figures for 1911 -20 and 1921-
40 were taken, respectiveley, from the US Trade Statistics and INEGI (1986, p. 687); 
US agricultural output in 1929 prices from Christy and Porter (1962, p. 148). 
Moreover, one can also observe that oscillations in price were much more 
marked than those in output. This seems to have resulted from a relatively low 
price-elasticity of supply combined with a high price-elasticity of demand for 
the fibre. For while the typical henequen planter incurred substantial fixed costs 
and faced few alternative investment opportunities,35 the cordage industry 
could easily substitute henequen with alternative fibres such as manila thus 
being extremely sensitive to fluctuations in henequen prices. So price variations 
accounted for most of the burden of imbalances between the demand and 
supply of henequen. Insofar as fluctuations in price outweighed those of output, 
the value of henequen exports displayed long swings throughout 1873-1912 
(table 13).36 
Table 13 
Mexico: Growth Measures of the Value (in US$) and the Quantum of 
Henequen Exports (in tons) 
VALUE 
g 
1884-1890 9.1 
1890-1897 -3.5 
1897-1906 14.6 
1906-1912 -2.5 
1912-1918 25.4 
1918-1928 -10.2 
1928-1936 -6.6 
Sources: as for graph 7. 
From the mid-1910s onwards, the pattern of henequen exports was shaped 
by far-reaching structural changes in the demand and supply of the fibre. On 
the demand side, the world trade in hemp was subject to depressive influences 
similar to those which plagued many other primary commodities, viz., the slow 
growth of the population in the core countries and changes in diets (Lewis, 
1949; Kindleberger, 1986).37 On the supply side, three main influences can be 
detected. First, the growth of the overseas supply of fibre, stimulated by World 
War I and unloaded in the world market thereafter, depressed fibre prices 
considerably during the 1920s. Secondly, cheaper synthetic substitutes for 
natural fibres were developed. Thirdly, there exists some evidence that Mexican 
henequen producers failed to break away from traditional production and 
management methods (Wells, 1985, pp. 142-50). This led Mexico to lose its 
share in the world henequen market, thus contributing to the slowing down of 
henequen exports during the inter-war period. In this process, the Mexican 
revolution played a minor role: the post-1918 decline of Mexico's henequen 
exports was largely induced by long-term economic forces, rather than by 
political ones.38 
With reference to coffee exports, graph 8 shows that their value was subject 
to long-swing variations throughout 1881-1929. This was because Mexico was 
a small country in the world coffee market and therefore faced world prices 
determined by the supply and demand for Brazilian coffee. However, the 
QUANTUM 
g 
1884-1890 2.4 
1890-1897 4.3 
1897-1907 3.9 
1912-1918 2.1 
1918-1928 0.1 
1928-1936 -3.3 
secular depreciation of the silver and hence of the peso exchange rate had a 
major positive impact on the growth trend of Mexico's coffee exports compared 
to Brazil's. Given the availability of land - opened up by railway expansion -
and of cheap labour, the quantum of coffee exports rapidly responded to the 
exchange rate depreciation: between the late 1870s and the late 1920s the 
quantum of Mexico's coffee exports growth averaged 5.1% p.a. - i.e., a rate 
much superior to Brazil's. As in the case of henequen, the Mexican revolution 
had a negligible impact on the long-term pattern of coffee exports.39 
Graph 8 
Source: Mitchell (1983, pp. 621-6). As in the previous graphs, values in peso were 
converted to US$ and put on a calendar year basis, figures for 1914-18 were obtained 
from US Department of Commerce (1914-18), United Kingdom, Board of Trade (1914-
18), France, Direction Generale des Daones et des Contributions Indirectes (1914-18). 
Copper and lead are typical cases of a rapid supply response to profit 
opportunities. The rail connection between the main producing areas of the 
country and the main consumer markets in the USA was set up by the early 
1890s (Bernstein, 1965, p. 33; Velasco Avila et al, 1988, p. 256). From 
producing no significant amount of copper and lead in the 1880s, Mexico had 
turned into the world's second major copper producer by 1901 and the second 
largest lead producer by 1920 (Nava Oteo, 1965, p. 194). Production expanded 
vigorously between 1890 and 1929, only interrupted by the US downswing of 
the 1930s. To explain this pattern, influences stemming from world demand and 
domestic supply have both to be looked at. 
On the demand side, the rapid expansion of the electricity industry in the 
core countries led to a major rise in world demand for copper and lead. 
Between c. 1890 and 1913, the electrical industry in the core countries was in 
the early stages of development, so that demand for these metals grew briskly 
(see graph 9). World War I provided some boost to the US electrical industry 
while the overseas supply of these metals was cut short; so, the prices of copper 
and lead almost doubled between 1913 and 1917 (US Department of 
Commerce, 1975, p. 602). With the end of the war, other countries' copper and 
lead stocks could be unloaded in the world market and there occurred a rise in 
the US production of these metals, resulting in oversupply. The world price fell 
as a consequence. Yet supply-side influences - to be discussed below -
prevented the fall in the quantum of exports until 1929, although not 
sufficiently to keep them up with the pre-World War I trend. 
On the supply side, the expansion of the Mexican electricity network made 
possible the introduction of electric pumps and drilling machines into the 
process of mineral extraction. The use of electric pumps to suck water from the 
mine led to an eightfold reduction in the cost per ton of mineral extracted, 
whereas the use of drilling machines contributed to a threefold cost reduction 
per ton of metal (Nava Oteo, 1980, p. 354). Secondly, the development of new 
extraction techniques such as cyanidation - introduced during the 1890s and 
diffused in the 1900s (Nava Oteo, 1965, p. 217) - and the flotation of the 1920s 
(Berstein, 1965, pp. 137-142), provided a major boost to output. Thirdly, there 
was the positive effect of the depreciation of the early 1890s, which converted 
mining into a highly profitable venture by raising the domestic price of 
minerals vis-a-vis wages and non-tradable goods (Nava Oteo, 1965, p. 205; 
1980, p. 374). Fourthly, pull factors in the US economy led to a spurt of US 
direct investment abroad from the late 1890s onwards, the effects of which 
spilled over into Mexico's mining industry, enhancing production (Nava Oteo, 
1980; Lewis, 1938; Wilkins, 1970). Because of all these factors, the long-term 
response of production to the price stimuli was dramatic - with price supply 
elasticities well above unity, as the following set of cointegrated OLS 
regressions indicate (all variables in logs, t-ratios in brackets):40 
R2=0.66; DW=0.78; ADF-test for residuals: tT=3.19 
R2=0.52; DW=0.85; ADF-test for residuals: tx=3.49 
(1887-1914) 
In contrast with silver, neither copper nor lead production were dramatically 
affected by the revolutionary struggles of the 1910s.41 In fact, new quantum 
data on Mexico's exports, depicted in graphs 9 and 9a, show that the revolution 
had, if anything, a minor negative impact on the quantum of copper exports 
during 1914-17 and a considerable positive influence on the lead export 
quantum over the same period. The important point to be made here is that such 
short-term fluctuations did not affect the respective long-term trends of the 
quantum exports of these products. Moreover, since their world price was being 
boosted by World War I, the value of Mexico's exports of both products 
actually rose during those years. Finally, the effect of government taxes upon 
mineral production does not seem to have been significant in altering the 
growth trends of copper and lead exports throughout the 1870-1937 period 
(Bernstein 1965, p. 132). This constitutes a further case against the argument 
that political variables had a major long-term effect upon export trends in 
Mexico. 
Table 14 
Mexico: Growth Measures of the Value of Copper and Lead Exports 
Scopper Slead 
1892-1899 21.4 1894-1901 12.4 
1899-1905 14.3 1901-1912 3.2 
1905-1912 6.9 1912-1920 19.9 
1912-1920 5.4 1920-1926 19.3 
1920-1929 6.7 1926-1937 -2.9 
Sources: as for graph 9. 
Graph 9 
Sources: value figures from Mitchell (1983, pp. 621-6), except for the 1913-17 years, 
the source of which was the US trade statistics. Quantum figures obtained by dividing 
value in US$ per New York (FOB) price index of copper in US Department of 
Commerce (1975, p. 602). 
Graph 9a 
Source: the same as graph 9. 
From producing virtually no crude oil before 1900, Mexico achieved a level 
of oil output of 193 million barrels by 1921. Such a rapid growth in crude 
petroleum production is another case of rapid supply response to the appearance 
of new profit opportunities. On the demand side, four main factors account for 
this.42 First, the growth of the automobile industry since the 1890s provided 
the required stimulus for the beginning of the search for oil. Systematic 
explorations by an American importing firm were undertaken during the 1890s 
and the first commercial output came in 1901, after which production increased 
dramatically. Secondly, the growth of domestic oil production was far in excess 
of domestic needs for refined oil for locomotives and automobiles, so that an 
increasing share of the domestic production was exported. This was especially 
true during 1913-18 because of the destruction of part of the railway network 
by revolutionary upheavals in central Mexico.43 
Graph 10 
Sources and methods: figures from 1921-1950 from Mitchell (1983, p. 626); before 
1921 we used the production figures from Nafinsa (1977, p. 52), assuming that 90% of 
the domestic production was exported, based on information provided in Meyer (1968, 
p. 19). 
Thirdly, the post-1921 decline in the value of oil exports was related to 
discoveries in Texas, Oklahoma, California and in Venezuela, which led to 
worldwide overproduction. As a consequence, prices fell by about a third 
between 1920 and 1929, with a negative impact on both production and the 
export quantum. 
A number of supply-side influences were also at work. For instance, the 
geographic distribution of Mexico's oil deposits were concentrated along the 
Mexican Gulf area, making possible an intensive exploitation over a short 
period of time. Once the first oil discovery was made in the late 1890s 
successive discoveries followed. Moreover, the oil producing areas were 
isolated from the regions where the revolutionary upheavals of 1913-17 took 
place and quite close to the main consumer market - the US. Thus, 
transportation problems caused by World War I had only a minor impact on oil 
exports. 
Paradoxically, these very factors that allowed an intensive exploration of 
Mexico's oil wells during the 1910s also led to their subsequent exhaustion. In 
this connection, a thorough study by the US Department of Commerce for the 
years 1927-30 clearly shows that the cost of extracting oil from the relatively 
unexploited wells in Venezuela was 38% lower than in Mexico (US Department 
of Commerce, 1932, p. 49). Since oil firms operating in Mexico were 
multinational corporations, they could easily have sent a substantial part of their 
funds to be reinvested in Venezuela. Such a cost differential seems to have 
been the most important factor accounting for the stagnation of investment in 
the sector and falling oil output in Mexico after 1921. This evidence qualifies 
the usual view that the uncertainty about the subsoil policy of the new 
government was the main factor behind the contraction of Mexico's oil 
production from 1921 (Meyer, 1968; Soil's, 1985).44 
To sum up, the above analysis has shown that the rapid and relatively stable 
growth pattern of Mexico's overall exports during 1870-1930 is clearly linked 
to their diversified composition and to structural peculiarities of the Mexican 
economy. In the case of silver, supply side influences predominated during the 
1870-1913 period, leading to a steady secular rise of the quantum of exports at 
the same time as international silver prices were falling. Only in the late 1920s 
did the slowdown in international demand for silver offset positive supply-side 
influences. In the case of sisal, supply influences predominated, generating long 
swings in the price of its exports during the pre-1913 period, while the quantum 
grew along a relatively stable path. From the mid-1910s on, although the 
slowdown in world demand was certainly important in explaining the decline 
of the quantum and price of Mexico's sisal, supply-side factors were no less 
prominent. With reference to coffee, international influences generated 
substantial price instability. However, the peculiarities of Mexico's monetary 
system - based on a silver standard - and the associated depreciation of the 
peso led to a high growth trend of coffee exports. Finally, in the cases of 
copper, lead and oil, the brisk pace of the international demand for these 
products and the substantial supply response to the international price stimuli 
are also behind the rapid pace of their exports. 
As a result of each of these commodities being subject to diverse influences, 
the cyclical instability of individual products was filtered out in the aggregate. 
Between 1914 and 1918, although the Revolution and World War I had some 
negative impact on Mexico's exports this was short-lasting and much milder 
than is usually assumed. Afterwards, no doubt international forces were the 
main factor behind the decline of Mexico's exports. But even then, the role of 
domestic factors in reinforcing international influences on the demand for 
commodities such as sisal and oil were of outstanding importance. 
III. The relationship between exports and 
domestic economic growth 
Having explained the growth pattern of the Brazilian and Mexican exports in 
section II, we are now concerned with what effect the observed export pattern 
had on aggregate economic growth. The three variables that must be analysed 
in this connection are the size of the export sector, the proportion of the value 
of exports which is retained domestically45 and the composition of domestic 
expenditure. The size of the export sector is a function of a host of factors, such 
as natural comparative advantage, historical patterns of specialisation and the 
level of per capita income and its distribution. Since a proper account of all 
these factors is beyond the scope of the present work, I shall take the size of the 
export sector as a given statistical datum. 
The rate of return of exports and the composition of domestic expenditure 
depend upon two influences: firstly, the transmission potential of export 
activities - which is, in turn, a function of their forward, backward and fiscal 
linkages; secondly, the effectiveness of such linkages, which depends on the 
relative prices of exportables, importables and non-tradable goods. 
This section provides an analysis of these variables - the size of the export 
sector, its linkages and changes in relative prices. Although the size and the 
linkages of the export sector have been extensively discussed in the theoretical 
literature on economic development (Watkins, 1963; Caves, 1966; Hirschman, 
1958, 1981), a careful consideration of their extent and effectiveness in the 
Brazilian and the Mexican contexts has not previously been undertaken.46 This 
lacuna is partly due to the difficulties of pinning down the issue given the 
absence of an input-output matrix for the period and the previous lack of 
relative price data. The absence of an input-output matrix implies that the 
analysis of the production linkages of the export sector has inevitably to rely 
on indirect information gathered from sectoral case studies and indirect 
measurement. Yet a number of recent sectoral case studies (e.g. Holloway, 
1980; Suzigan, 1986; Cardenas, 1987; Haber, 1989) and the reconstruction of 
price data (Gongalves, 1982; Catao, 1991, 1992) now allow us to shed new 
light on the export transmission mechanism, as will be seen below. 
Brazil 
An idea of the relative size of the Brazilian export sector can be gained by 
comparing the export share in GDP in Brazil with that in Mexico, Argentina 
and Canada. The respective figures are presented in table 15. Brazil, in contrast, 
appears to have been quite an open economy in the pre-1914 period. This 
scenario, however, changed somewhat. Structural changes associated with 
World War I and its aftermath led to a dramatic closing up of the Brazilian 
economy between c. 1910 and 1929. 
Table 15 
Export/GDP Ratios in 1929 Prices (in %) 
1900 1910 1920 1929 
BRAZIL 23.2 19.6 17.8 12.8 
MEXICO 6.9 10.5 17.6* 12.6 
ARGENTINA - 21.6 24.3 23.9 
CANADA 24.7 18.4 29.3 19.2 
* refers to 1921 
Sources: Brazil: IBGE (1987, pp. 94, 111, 523-4); Mexico: Soil's (1985, pp. 79-
80, 92) and Catao (1991, pp. 233-34). Argentina and Canada: Mitchell (1983, 
pp. 540, 555, 882-90, 898-99), export price from Buckley and Urguhart (1962, 
p. 184), with the Argentine real GDP being set in real terms by using the price 
deflator provided in the same source (pp. 837-38) and the export price deflator 
of Di Telia and Zymelman (1967, pp. 78, 352 and 289). 
The development literature has singled out three basic economic stimuli 
behind the setting up of forward linkages.47 First, when export activities 
provide other sectors with inputs at a lower cost. Secondly, when there exist 
technical complementarities between the production of a raw material and its 
further processing.48 Thirdly, when the production of the export commodity 
is partly channelled towards domestic consumption, thus supplying the domestic 
market with goods which are cheaper than their imported counterpart. The two 
first cases correspond to what Hirschman (1981) has called forward production 
linkages, whereas the latter constitute forward consumption linkages. 
Let us then discuss, within this framework, whether the Brazilian export 
sector generated significant forward production linkages with the rest of the 
economy during the period 1870-1940. The case of coffee - Brazil's main 
export product throughout the period - is obvious: it does not constitute an 
input for industrial or other agricultural activities. On the other hand, the 
development of coffee processing operations also seems to have been limited: 
before World War II almost all the Brazilian coffee was roasted in the 
consuming countries (Rowe, 1963, p. 26). Thus, growth variations in coffee 
exports did not affect the domestic economy through forward production 
linkages. 
The other important export activity was rubber extraction. In contrast with 
coffee, rubber is an important input for the automobile, electricity and other 
modern industries. Yet, its production in Brazil failed to foster these industrial 
activities within the country during the rubber boom period (1900-10). At that 
time, Brazil exported rubber in its raw form to be processed in the consuming 
countries; domestic rubber manufacturing was then practically non-existent 
(Suzigan, 1986, p. 299). Only during World War I did the domestic industry of 
rubber artefacts begin to develop, although by 1919 it still accounted for quite 
a small share of the country's manufacturing output (Brazil, Ministerio da 
Agricultura, Industria e Comercio, 1920). In any case, these developments were 
only marginally stimulated by the rapid growth of exports. For by the end of 
World War I Brazil had already lost her comparative advantage in rubber 
production and hence its capacity to supply the domestic industry with rubber 
at low comparative costs. The development of the Brazilian rubber industry in 
the inter-war period was more a result of deliberate policies aimed at 
preventing a sharp decline in the country's rubber production (ibid., p. 301) 
than of a genuine economic stimulus stemming from export-led growth. So, in 
the case of rubber as well, export fluctuations had little impact upon the 
domestic economy via forward production linkages. 
In the case of raw cotton production, although there exists evidence that it 
stimulated the setting up of cotton mills near the producing areas in the 1870s 
(Stein, 1957, p. 108), the relevance of this linkage to the later development of 
domestic cotton manufacturing seems to have been quite limited. As already 
pointed out, the recovery of US cotton production after the Civil War reduced 
the world price and undermined the international competitiveness of Brazilian 
cotton. From then until the 1920s, cotton in Brazil assumed the features of a 
marginal crop. Its low quality compared to the imported counterpart and the 
irregularity of the domestic supply turned Brazilian cotton into a hindrance 
rather than an additional stimulus to the development of the domestic textile 
industry (ibid., pp. 46-9). As late as 1909, Brazilian cotton was substantially 
more costly for the local producer than its imported counterpart (ibid., pp. 223, 
fn. 25). Only from the late 1900s is there evidence that domestic cotton played 
a progressive role in fostering the development of domestic textiles (ibid., p. 
108). By that time, however, cotton textile manufacturing was already a 
well-established branch of Brazil's manufacturing industry. 
Forward consumption linkages also do not seem to have been significant. 
The weight of coffee, rubber or raw cotton in the composition of a 
representative wage goods basket was minimal. Among these three products, 
the most widely consumed domestically - coffee - accounted for about only 
0.9% of total current expenditures in 1919 (Affonseca, 1919) and 1.2% in 1949 
(Conjuntura Economica, 1949, p. 7) - a percentage share which is much below 
that of staples such as beans, manioc, rice and wheat. 
In short, the transmission of export growth through forward linkages - on 
both the production and the consumption side - can be considered negligible 
in Brazil during the period 1870-1930. 
Turning to backward linkages, their relevance depends on two factors: i) the 
extent to which export growth induces the domestic production of the inputs 
used in the production of exportables (backward production linkages); ii) 
whether the expenditures of capitalists and workers employed in export 
activities induce the development of other sectors in the economy (backward 
consumption linkages). In order to single out these two effects, one has to look 
at both the basic nature of technology employed in the making of exportable 
goods and the propensity and composition of workers' and capitalists' 
expenditures. 
In the case of Brazil, it has been seen that coffee was by far the main export 
product throughout 1870-1930. It is well known that the basic operations of 
coffee production - clearing the land, planting, pruning and harvesting - are 
highly labour-intensive (Laerne, 1885; Delfim Netto, 1959; Holloway, 1975). 
Although a precise quantification of the share of labour in the total cost of 
coffee output is not feasible for the period, due to important non-monetary 
benefits accruing to agricultural workers (Holloway, 1980, pp. 74-87), rough 
estimates are revealing. The 1907 census, for instance, reports that operations 
such as cultivating, harvesting and transporting the crop to the drying areas, 
which in most cases were undertaken by the worker with a simple hoe, 
accounted for 52% to 57% of the unit FOB value of the product (Brazil, 
1908-9, pp. 91-92). If, on top of that, one adds labour costs associated with 
brokerage and packing operations, it is reasonable to say that labour costs 
accounted for over 70% of the final price of coffee. This percentage share did 
not change substantially during the period 1870-1940 due to the slow pace of 
technical progress in the sector (Furtado, 1963, pp. 169, 177-8; Pelaez, 1971, 
pp. 75-6; Dean, 1975, p. 7; Holloway, 1980, pp. 29-34).49 In these 
circumstances, the growth pattern we observed in coffee exports - long swings 
around a relatively slow growth trend - had a corresponding major impact on 
aggregate employment. 
Having seen that exports induced substantial variations in aggregate 
employment, how did the latter affect domestic output? To answer this 
question, the coffee worker's propensity to consume as well as the composition 
of his expenditures must be examined. 
Between 1870 and the early- 1880s, slaves made up the bulk of the labour 
force in the Brazilian coffee sector. In this context, although slaves have to be 
fed and clothed, the rather low level of their subsistence requirements implied 
that the demand for goods produced elsewhere in the economy via workers' 
expenditures was clearly minimal. 
This situation, however, changed dramatically from the mid-1880s onwards. 
A soaring demand for labour by the coffee sector and the accelerating decline 
of slavery induced mass immigration into Brazil (Hall, 1969; Holloway, 1980). 
Fostered by coffee prices, immigration growth proceeded along a long-swing 
path, with upswings in 1885-95, 1902-12 and 1920-9 (Graham, 1973). Its 
impact upon the country's labour market was considerable.50 Between 1880 
and 1913, for instance, immigration accounted for a near one-sixth increase in 
the country's total population and a much higher increase in the labour force 
(Goldsmith, 1986, p. 81). 
This brought about far-reaching structural changes in the expenditure pattern 
of coffee workers, with important consequences for the domestic transmission 
of export growth. First, the immigrant's purchasing power was far superior to 
that of the slave. New demands consisted of foodstuffs, kerosene, simple tools 
and low-quality textiles (Holloway, 1980, p. 78-80). Since these goods were 
produced domestically, a considerable part of the demand brought about by a 
rise in agricultural employment and wages during export upswings did not leak 
abroad under the form of import growth. Rather, it fostered domestic demand 
for non-tradable goods and import substitution, as will be discussed in detail 
below. 
Secondly, since a substantial part of the immigrants' wage was paid in cash, 
a dramatic increase in the demand for money took place. The increasing 
monetisation that then followed strengthened the links between the coffee 
sector and the rest of the economy - with the domestic manufacturing sector in 
particular. 
Thirdly, the average immigrant had a relatively high propensity to save -
between 27% to 38%, according to Holloway's estimates (1980, pp. 85-6).51 
A substantial amount of these savings was eventually invested within the 
country. This is in line with balance-of-payments estimates presented in table 
16, which show that immigrants' remittances (included under 'transfers') were 
relatively unimportant in macroeconomic terms. Moreover, some of these 
immigrant workers themselves became coffee planters or industrialists 
producing for the domestic market (Holloway, 1980, pp. 139-66). Hence a 
positive effect on investment resulted. 
Table 16 
Brazil: The Structure of the Balance of Payments (% of Total Flows) 
1882/83* 1890 1899 1930 
TOTAL INFLOWS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
commodity exports (FOB) 87.3 78.7 72.8 79.0 
long-term capital 12.5 17.5 27.2 21.0 
changes in reserves 0.2 3.8 - -
TOTAL OUTFLOWS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
commodity imports (CIF) 82.8 71.7 63.0 40.9 
profit remittances 0.4 1.9 1.1 
foreign debt amortisation 4.5 1.1 4.5 4.8 
interests 5.0 8.8 8.8 19.4 
others 0.3 1.9 2.6 2.3 
transfers 2.3 1.1 3.2 -
changes in reserves - - 10.8 18.2 
errors and omissions 4.7 13.6 6.0 14.4 
* fiscal year ** includes profit remittances 
Sources: Figures for 1880/1 and 1990 were obtained based on data from Franco 
(1988, pp. 25-27); 1930 figures from IBGE (1987, p. 535). 
Turning now to the destination of profits generated in the export sector, there 
also exists persuasive evidence that they fostered the expansion of domestic 
activities in a most significant way. In order to show this, let us focus on three 
key parameters, namely the nationality of the coffee planter, his propensity to 
consume and to invest, and the composition of his expenditures. 
In contrast with other periphery countries (such as Mexico, see below), the 
production and commercialisation of coffee were, by and large, under the 
control of Brazilian nationals. Foreign ownership of land in Brazil was 
minimal. Although figures for the country as a whole are not available, surveys 
carried out in the main coffee producing state of the country (Sao Paulo) for the 
years 1920 and 1934 indicate that Brazilian nationals owned 83.7% and 72.5% 
of the total cultivated area, respectively (Holloway, 1980, p. 152 and 163). 
These figures are certainly lower bounds for the country as a whole, since Sao 
Paulo absorbed far more immigrants-turned-into-planters than the remaining 
states of the Republic.52 As regards the commercialisation of coffee exports, 
although the presence of foreigners (notably, the Portuguese operating as 
broker) was more marked, it was by no means overwhelming (Sweigart, 1980). 
In any case, their foreign remittances were not so significant in macroeconomic 
terms, as the balance-of-payment estimates of table 16 show. 
Also, in contrast with many other periphery economies,53 Brazilian 
exporters spent a relatively small proportion of their profits on conspicuous 
consumption. Studies on the portfolio composition of their assets and on the 
ownership structure of large firms during the period suggest that, besides 
investing in the expansion of export crops, coffee planters ventured their 
fortunes in other activities connected with the expansion of the domestic 
market, notably, import-substitution manufacturing (Dean, 1975, pp. 34-48; 
Cardoso de Mello, 1985, pp. 131-8 and 141-2; Saes, 1986, pp. 44-64, 80-8 and 
103-10).54 Foreign currency and bonds do not seem to have absorbed 
landowners' savings in any significant amount (Cardoso de Mello, 1985). 
Hence fluctuations in export prices and therefore in capitalists' profits had a 
major impact on aggregate spending - a phenomenon already observed by 
Furtado (1963, ch. 26). Although a share of these expenditures leaked abroad 
due to the underdeveloped stage of domestic industry,55 a considerable 
proportion consisted of investment in land, coffee trees and consumption of 
simpler goods, which were met by domestic supply.56 
Summing up, qualitative evidence on the technology employed in coffee 
production indicates that the value added embodied in a unit of the product was 
very high indeed. Due to both the expenditure habits of workers and capitalists 
in the sector, it is clear that export growth had a substantial impact on domestic 
output performance. 
Finally, the importance of the fiscal linkage needs to be considered. The 
latter represents the share of the income generated in export or import activities 
which is taxed and feeds back into the economy through government 
expenditures. This was especially important in the pre-1930 period, when most 
of the federal government revenues arose from tariffs on the value of imports 
(table 17). Imports grew in line with exports due to the operation of the 
transmission mechanisms above. Thus, export fluctuations tended to shape the 
pattern of government revenues and expenditures which, therefore, followed 
long swings. 
The impact of government expenditures on total aggregate demand can be 
gleaned from table 18. From 1900 onwards, when more reliable GDP data 
becomes available, public expenditures accounted averaged 8% to 10% of GDP, 
even if we discount the leakages associated with the foreign debt service. Such 
a share is comparable to that of aggregate investment and, therefore, quite 
considerable in terms of its leverage on aggregate demand.57 
Table 17 
Brazil: Composition of Public Revenues (in % of Total) 
1890 1900 1912 1919 1937 
tm/T 70 54 34 42 34 
tci/T - 12 10 20 20 
ty/T - - - 3 7 
tothers/T 30 34 56 35 39 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 
tm = revenues from tariffs on imports; tci = revenues from taxes on 
consumption of industrialised products; ty = revenues from income tax; T = 
total public revenues. 
Sources: Villela and Suzigan (1973, pp. 404-5). 
The case in point is further strengthened when one considers the shifts in the 
composition of public expenditures. Figures of table 18 show that, for periods 
of downswing in public expenditures brought about by a fall in export earnings, 
such as the 1890s and 1919-29, investment was sharply cut down; the opposite 
happened in periods of export prosperity, such as the 1900s. Since public 
investment consisted mainly of the opening up of ports, railways and 
infrastructural works, it had a clear bearing on the country's export potential. 
Thus, phases of lower or negative export growth coincided with periods of 
slow-down in export capacity and vice-versa. 
Table 18 
Brazil: Federal Government Expenditures as a Share of GDP and the 
Share of Investment in Total Government Expenditures (%) 
1890 1900 1912 1919 1928 1937 
G/GDP 11.0 12.0 9.0 7.0 10.0 
IG/G 9.3 3.2 21.7 31.7 5.2 4.7 
Discounting the foreign debt service: 
GVGDP 9.1 8.7 7.3 5.1 9.2 
Ig /G 12.5 2.3 24.8 38.3 6.9 5.1 
Sources: public expenditures from IBGE (1987, pp. 570-1); real GDP from 
IBGE (pp. 94, 111), deflated by the price indicator from Catao (1992) and 
Haddad (1978, p. 166); public investment figures from Villela and Suzigan 
(1973, p. 403). 
To sum up, the growth and fluctuations of exports in Brazil had a potentially 
important macroeconomic impact via three different mechanisms. The first 
mechanism was related to the nature of exporters' expenditures and, in 
particular, their propensity to invest in domestic activities. This was reinforced 
by a second mechanism - namely, the propensity to consume and the 
composition of expenditures of the agricultural worker from the mid-1880s 
onwards. Thirdly, variations in export earnings affected the level of public 
expenditure and its composition: in periods of export upswings, government 
expenditures were boosted and so was government's current consumption and 
investment in infrastructure; the opposite occurred during export downswings. 
* * * 
With regard to the effectiveness of these transmission mechanisms, the 
extent to which such aggregate demand effects were matched by the growth of 
domestic production depended on two factors - the relative size of the 
non-tradable v. the tradable sector and changes in relative prices. 
Although a clear-cut distinction between tradable and non-tradable sectors 
in pre-1930 Brazil is not feasible, it is well-known that a number of activities 
were highly protected from foreign competition by prohibitive costs of 
transportation, information and tariff rates (Leff, 1982; Catao, 1991). These 
include the production of staples such as beans, corn, manioc and rice, the 
service sector, government and part of industry. Back-of-the-envelope 
calculations thus indicate that 60% to 70% of Brazil's aggregate output was 
made up of non-tradable goods.58 
In the case of these goods the expansion of aggregate demand had an 
unambiguously positive impact on production, irrespective of changes in the 
price of imports. The only constraint in this regard was the low elasticity of the 
domestic supply of agricultural staples - a well-documented phenomenon in 
19th century Brazil (Ferreira Soares, 1977; Furtado, 1963; Leff, 1982). In fact, 
at the same time as the quantum of exports grew at a rate of 2.8% p.a. and 
imports at 2.7%, non-tradable prices were also rising at a rate of 2.1% p.a. 
between the early 1870s and the late 1920s. So, about three-quarters of the 
aggregate demand effect upon non-tradable production was offset by rising 
prices, the other quarter being met by the expansion of domestic production. 
The impact of export growth on the tradable share of GDP, however, 
depended crucially on the behaviour of relative prices. The bulk of these 
activities consisted of manufacturing production, which faced direct 
competition from imports. In these circumstances, depending on how 
competitive the final price of the domestic manufactures was relative to the 
imported similar product, aggregate demand effects of export expansion would 
leak abroad in the form of higher imports. 
A measure of variations in the competitive power of the domestic producer 
is plotted in graph l l5 9 This clearly shows that periods of export expansion, 
such as the early 1870s, the late 1880s, and the 1900s, were marked by a 
decline in the level of real protection for the domestic manufacturing industry. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, import substitution stagnated during those years, 
despite the high degree of 'natural protection' enjoyed by domestic industry. 
For instance, during 1870-1873, 1885-1893 and 1902-13, all sub-periods of 
rapid export expansion, import substitution expanded at the meagre rates of 
1.6%, 2% and 2.4% per annum respectively, whereas between 1920 and 1929, 
in particular, import substitution was virtually brought to a halt.60 
Only during the 1890s and World War I, when there was a significant 
improvement in relative prices for the manufacturing sector, did import 
substitution accelerate, having expanded at the impressive annual rates of 11% 
in 1893-1901 and 13% in 1913-18. Yet these years were marked by a slowdown 
of exports and hence of aggregate demand: rough estimates point to a fall of 
about 2% p.a. between 1893 and 1901 and to an expansion of only 1.4% during 
1913-18.61 So, the positive import substitution effect upon manufacturing 
production was partly constrained by a negative income effect during these 
sub-periods. 
The upshot of this story, therefore, is that unfavourable relative prices during 
periods of export expansion constrained the Brazilian industrialisation to a 
considerable extent. The fact that industrial growth still thrived in spite of these 
relatively unfavourable price trends is due to a certain degree of 'natural' 
protection as well as a number of other factors which have been extensively 
discussed in the existing literature (Holloway, 1980; Leff, 1982; Suzigan, 
1986). The main point of the above discussion should then be clear: export 
growth failed to promote more generalised industrialisation in Brazil during 
1870-1930 not only because it was relatively slow and unstable but also due to 
the negative correlation between export expansion and the variations in the 
degree of real protection for the domestic manufacturing sector. Two main 
reasons are behind the phenomenon: firstly, the extreme dependence of 
exchange rate to variations in export earnings in a non-convertible paper money 
regime, where international reserves were too limited to stabilise the exchange 
rate;62 secondly, the passive nature of commercial policy, which failed to 
counteract through tariff changes the relative decline in import prices. The first 
factor was beyond the government's control: it was due to both the structural 
asymmetries of the working of the international gold standard63 and the 
volatile nature of coffee exports. The second factor was certainly within the 
reach of the government, though also under contraints of a political nature. Be 
it as it may, the failure of export growth to foster industrialisation cannot by 
any means be attributed to excessive or misconceived policy intervention. 
Graph 11 
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Sources: IBGE (1987) and Catao (1991). 
Mexico 
Mexico's case constitutes an interesting contrast with Brazil's in many respects. 
First of all, the degree of openness of the Mexican economy, although having 
increased during the Porfiriato, was still relatively low by 1910. During the 
1910s the export ratio increased considerably, but even then was never as high 
as that of Brazil or of any other recent settlement country (table 15) 
The forward linkages in Mexico were also of a different nature. The bulk 
of her exports (82% in 1870-1912, 60-75% in 1920-39) consisted of mining 
products - mainly silver, oil, copper and lead - which had major industrial 
applications. So, a case for the existence of potentially important forward 
production linkages has to be carefully considered. 
The first category of forward linkages to be examined here is the 
development of smelting and refining plants to process the raw material. 
Although data on the share of the mineral production processed locally are not 
available until the 1929 production census, there exists ample qualitative 
evidence that the number of smelting plants grew rapidly after the 1880s (Nava 
Oteo, 1965, pp. 267-8). Yet it was during 1890-1929, when copper, lead and 
gold production moved onto a higher growth phase, that local melting and 
refining plants proliferated (Bernstein, 1965, pp. 37-9,49-56). Notwithstanding 
this, the aggregate impact of these developments on the domestic economy 
seems to have been much more limited than the above cited case studies 
suggest. First of all, not only mineral extraction but also melting and refining 
are both highly capital-intensive activities, so that they generate little 
employment opportunities.64 Hence the share of the mining sector in GDP is 
so low - 3.0% in 1895, 4.7% in 1910 and 6.3% in 1929 (Soli's, 1985, p. 79). 
Of the total 1929 mining output, about 5% was processed locally, which is 
equivalent to only 0.32% of the real GDP in that year.65 Secondly, the 
development of these activities resulted not only from export growth per se but 
also from other autonomous forces under the form of railway expansion, the 
pull of US investment since the 1890s, and innovations such as the introduction 
of electricity, cyanidisation and the floating processes.66 Thirdly, although 
production figures on processing activities are not available, the growth of local 
refining was constrained by the proximity of Mexico to the USA: in the period 
1870-1900, before the mammoth refining plant of Monterrey was set up, 
Mexican lead smelters in the largest mineral producing states found it cheaper 
to send lead bullion by rail to Tampico and then by steamer to New York for 
refining (Bernstein, 1965, p. 40).67 Fourthly, it has been shown that, because 
of the limited size of the domestic market for intermediate goods and because 
of technological indivisibilities,68 mineral processing industries (such as the 
Monterrey foundry) often operated at well below 50% capacity (Haber, 1989, 
pp. 31 -3). This precluded economies of scale, led to low productivity and hence 
to less output and employment. 
With reference to oil, we have again the problem of a lack of data on the 
percentage share of the oil produced which was refined in Mexico. Yet there 
exists indirect evidence that the bulk of the oil extracted from Mexican fields 
during the 1900s and early 1910s was refined in the USA (Meyer, 1968, p. 32). 
Only from 1916 on, did the number of oil refining plants in Mexico grow 
substantially, as a result of both higher taxes on unrefined oil exports and rising 
production (ibid.). Such a rapid growth of domestic refining operations, 
together with rocketing oil exports and the slowdown of agricultural and 
manufacturing activities, led to a jump in the oil sector's share of GDP, from 
0.2% in 1910 to 10.2% in 1921. Notwitstanding this, only about 30% of 
Mexico's oil production in the early 1920s was refined domestically69 and, as 
late as 1929, oil refining actitivies accounted for a meagre 0.21% of GDP.70 
The other type of forward linkage to be considered is the extent to which the 
domestic production of copper, lead and oil provided other sectors with 
low-cost inputs. In this respect, the evidence available also points to the relative 
unimportance of forward linkages. Silver, copper, lead, oil and henequen 
presented very high export/output ratios - all above 90% in the mid-1920s 
(Cardenas, 1987, p. 25). Such ratios were higher before the 1920s and, in 
particular, during the revolution, when the domestic consumption of 
intermediate goods decreased considerably. Before then, those ratios were even 
lower than in the 1920s due to the underdeveloped stage of the domestic 
producer goods industry, the main consumer of such inputs.71 
The outcome, therefore, is that forward linkages of export activities in 
Mexico had an important macroeconomic impact only as regards oil exports 
during the 1910s and 1920s. The remaining mineral export activities, such as 
silver, copper and lead, had a negligible impact through the setting up of 
forward linkages throughout c. 1870-1930. As for agricultural exports such as 
coffee and sisal, they were not used domestically as inputs for productive 
activities and had very high export/production ratios.72 As such, no significant 
forward linkages were established through the export of these goods. 
Turning to backward linkages, since mineral products employed highly 
capital intensive methods, the share of domestic labour force absorbed in the 
sector was minimal. This is clearly shown in table 19. Thus, the impact of 
mining workers' expenditures on total output was relatively unimportant. 
Table 19 
Mexico: Sectoral Distribution of the Labour Force (% of Total) 
1895 1930 
Agriculture 66.5 68.7 
Manufacturing 11.5 9.9 
Commerce 16.0 16.4 
Mining 1.8 1.0 
Construction 2.3 1.9 
Transport 1.6 1.9 
Others 0.6 0.2 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
Source: Keesing (1969). 
Secondly, the bulk of the mining and oil sectors' demand for producer goods 
was met by imports, for Mexico did not begin to produce oil pipes, drilling 
machinery and other sophisticated mining equipment until the 1940s. Only a 
small part of the intermediate inputs such as cement, dynamite and pig iron, 
began to be produced domestically from the 1900s on (Rosenzweig, 1965, pp. 
318-35; Haber, 1989, pp. 27-43). Thus most of the increase in demand brought 
about by mineral exports leaked abroad. 
This conclusion is reinforced when one notes the overwhelming foreign 
ownership of the mining sector. Given both the proximity of Mexico to the 
USA and the absence of exchange controls throughout 1870-1947, the 
macroeconomic importance of profit remittances was quite considerable. This 
is clearly shown in table 20. The most striking feature revealed in the latter is 
the relatively low share of commodity imports into total outflows when 
compared with Brazil (table 16).73 In other words, a small proportion of the 
inflows associated with export earnings and foreign investment was absorbed 
domestically. 
Table 20 
Mexico: Structure of the Balance of Payments (% of Total Flows) 
1909-1910 1926 1940 
TOTAL INFLOWS 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Commodity exports 59.3 94.4 68.1 
Gold coins and ingots 1.7 2.0 16.7 
Tourism 1.6 0.3 4.6 
Other 0.6 0.7 0.3 
Long-term capital 26.8 2.3 10.1 
Errors and omissions - 0.3 0.2 
TOTAL OUTFLOWS 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Merchandise 53.9 52.1 60.2 
Foreign debt service 7.7 3.6 0.9 
Profit remittances 33.7 39.6 35.1 
Transfers 4.4 2.4 0.9 
Other 0.3 2.3 2.9 
Source: Cardenas (1987, p. 248-9). 
Agricultural exports constitute another channel through which export 
fluctuations might have had a significant macroeconomic impact. This, 
however, seems not to have been the case either. First, the exported share of 
Mexico's agricultural output was not particularly large. During 1892-1908 
exports accounted for 15% to 20% of total agricultural production (El Colegio 
de Mexico, 1960b, p. 63),74 then falling throughout the inter-war period: from 
14.3% in 1925 and 15.5% in 1928-30, it declined to 10.5% in 1937-9. 
Secondly, a substantial part of Mexico's land was owned by foreigners. The 
share in 1910 was 25.2%. It is true that, as a result of the land distribution 
policies following the revolution, foreign ownership fell to 16.2% in 1927 
(Tannenbaum, 1968, p. 368). However, there exists evidence that foreign 
ownership was greater in the case of the land devoted to export crops such as 
coffee and sugar (ibid). Since Americans accounted for about half of the 
foreign ownership of land in Mexico and given the proximity of the two 
countries, it is quite likely that these landlords remitted abroad a substantial 
part of their earnings stemming from agricultural exports. In short, although a 
dearth of empirical evidence on this matter prevents us from making a more 
definite statement, it seems plain that the share of the value of Mexico's 
agricultural exports returned locally was considerably lower than for Brazil. 
As a third factor, one has to consider the consumption and investment 
propensities of Mexico's agriculturalists, since workers' demand was generally 
kept at a rather low level due to socio-economic influences operating 
throughout the pre-revolutionary period (Katz, 1974). Although general 
information on capitalists' expenditure habits is lacking for important sectors 
such as coffee and cotton, there exists valuable information on this issue 
concerning the henequen or sisal planter. Sisal was Mexico's most important 
agricultural export item before the 1930s (table 10). Moreover, the average 
return of investment in sisal was especially high: contemporary observers 
reported that during 1900-1910 it was no less than 50% and sometimes as high 
as 400% to 600% (Joseph, 1986, p. 57). Thus, the relevance of enquiring about 
the consumption and investment habits of sisal exporters is obvious. 
In the first place, although the overwhelming majority of sisal planters were 
Mexican nationals, US engineers and technicians figured prominently in the 
operation of the most dynamic branches of Yucatan's economy, such as 
railways, telegraph, ports and public utilities (Baklanoff, 1980, p. 209). 
Moreover, because sisal cultivation was a large scale business, one which 
involved long production lags, it demanded large financial resources. Given the 
underdeveloped stage of the domestic capital markets, these resources had to 
come from abroad. Thus, dividends and amortisation payments were due. The 
foreign ownership factor as a cause of a high level of resources outflow 
certainly holds here. 
Secondly, the commercialisation of the fibre was concentrated in the hands 
of a couple of foreign export houses throughout the 1870-1915 period. During 
1902-1915, in particular, a single foreign house (International Harvest 
Company) had considerable control over the price of the fibre, thus reaping 
extra profits and remitting them abroad.75 
Finally, the consumption habits of Mexico's henequen planters also seem to 
account for a substantial part of the leakage effect. In this respect, a description 
of their life-style is telling: 
'Looking to the far-off capitals of the western world for inspiration and design, 
the prosperous henequeneros built ornate palaces with marble pillars, intricately 
carved fagades, and ostentatious stained-glass enclosed porticoes. . . In addition 
to engaging in pleasant after-dinner conversation while sipping imported French 
wines on his shaded veranda, the henequen oligarch also spent considerable time 
keeping abreast of current stock quotations from the Paris bourse and dabbling 
in urban and rural real state' (Turner, Barbarous Mexico, as quoted in Wells, 
1985, p. 61-2). 
Such a vivid description clearly points to the high propensity to consume 
luxury goods and to the unproductive investment by the typical henequen 
exporter. Although Turner's view has been subject to the qualification that 
large henequen planters also branched out into railway building and banking 
connected with foreign trade (Wells, 1985, pp. 63-88), this does not affect the 
main point about the role of profits generated within the henequen sector, i.e., 
its failure to foster growth elsewhere in the economy and thus increase the 
value added of national output. Also, railways and foreign trade banking, 
besides being sectors with a very high import component and substantial 
foreign participation, did not contribute to import substitution and then to an 
eventual diversification of the domestic economy. The fact that the sisal 
producing state of Yucatan grew very fast between 1870 and 1910 and was by 
then one of the wealthiest states in the Republic (Baklanoff, 1980, p. 212), 
while today it is among the poorest and least industrialised, tells us a great deal 
about how the surplus derived from sisal exports was actually spent. 
Having seen that the backward linkages of the Mexican export sector 
conspired against export-led growth, let us examine now the importance of the 
fiscal linkage. Hirschman (1981) has argued that in cases where the backward 
linkages of the export sector are negligible, the fiscal linkage is of outstanding 
importance. This is because the government has more room to tax the export 
sector when the latter is mainly made up of enclave industries. Hirschman's 
argument, however, does not fit the Mexican experience. As table 21 shows, the 
contribution of taxes on natural resources to total government revenues, 
although having risen in the post-revolution years, remained relatively low till 
the late 1930s.76 
Besides the low level of direct taxation imposed on mining activities and low 
export taxes, across-the-board tariff exemptions were conceded on capital goods 
imports, the bulk of which consisted of purchases by the mining sector itself.77 
So, the total revenues generated by export activities via both direct and indirect 
taxation were very low indeed, contrary to what Hirschman's argument 
suggests. If we also consider that the value of imports was considerably smaller 
than the total export value, it is easy to see that overall public revenues in 
Mexico accounted for a relatively small share of GDP. This imposed limits 
upon the expansion of public expenditures throughout 1870-1930. As a result, 
the public expenditure percentage share of GDP was kept at a low level relative 
to other periphery countries. In fact, as table 22 shows, the public expenditure 
share of GDP in Mexico before the 1930s was distinctly low when compared 
with Brazil's (table 18). 
Table 21 
Mexico: Composition of Public Revenues (%) 
1876-7 1882-3 1890-91 1899-90 1905-6 1910-11 1925 1937 
tm/T 46 57 55.0 44.0 45.0 44.0 24 23 
tx/T 6 2 0.2 1.4 1.0 0.5 6 4 
tnr/T 4 1 0.3 5.7 2.8 2.3 12 7 
ti/T - - 8.4 8.5 8.0 11 20 
to/T 44 40 44.5 48.9 42.7 38.8 47 43 
tm = revenues from import taxes 
tx = revenues from export taxes 
tnr= revenues from taxation on natural-resource based activities 
ti = revenues from consumption of industrial goods 
to = revenues from other sources 
T = total revenues 
Sources: El Colegio de Mexico (1960b, pp. 199, 201); INEGI (1986, p. 632). 
With reference to the composition of public expenditures, the investment 
share was not particularly high before the 1920s (table 22). Neither was there 
a marked cyclical pattern as in the case of Brazil. In any case, even if public 
investment had a significant impact on export growth, the latter failed to be 
transmitted to the remaining sectors of the economy. Only the rapid rise of 
public investment between 1920 and 194078 appears to have had a very 
significant impact upon domestic output (Cardenas, 1987, pp. 154-5). Yet since 
the bulk of these expenditures was financed through borrowing from the 
banking sector, through the issuing of government bonds and at the expense of 
administrative costs (ibid., pp. 154-7), the type of fiscal linkage discussed 
above did not play any significant role here either. 
Table 22 
Mexico: Budgeted Federal Government Expenditures as a Share of GDP 
and the Share of Investment in Total Budgeted Government Expenditures 
(in %)79 
1883-84 1895-96 1900-01 1910-11 1925 1937 
G/GDP — 5.6 4.7 3.5 6.1 7.0 
Ig/G 9.1 7.3 7.9 9.1 27.9 42.6 
Source: INEGI (1986, pp. 311, 603-4, 627-8). 
To sum up, the analysis of the size of the Mexican export sector as well as 
of its several possible linkages within the domestic economy suggests that the 
growth pattern of Mexican exports had a minor impact upon both employment 
and demand for domestically produced goods. Thus, it is not surprising that the 
long-term stability of Mexico's export growth during 1870-1912 was at 
variance with the domestic growth instability observed for production and 
investment indicators (Haber, 1989; Catao, 1991). The only important, albeit 
indirect, contribution of export expansion to macroeconomic growth was to 
provide other sectors, notably manufacturing, with foreign exchange to import 
the required amount of capital goods. Since the price of the latter would be 
exorbitant under autarky, a slow growth of exports could hamper the expansion 
of domestic output and thus lead to cyclical variations due to foreign exchange 
bottlenecks. In Mexico, this did not in fact occur because periods of rapid 
expansion of domestic output via import substitution, such as 1875-82 and 
1891-1900 (Catao, 1991, ch. V), coincided with periods of rapid export growth. 
Only in the 1920s, due to the rising weight of the export sector during the 
late 1900s and 1910s, did exports contribute in a significant way to the 
downswing in real GDP. In short, the failure of export-led growth in Mexico 
should be mainly attributed to the limited linkages of her export sector. 
IV. Conclusions 
This paper has shown that exports failed to promote generalised economic 
development in Brazil and Mexico for a number of different reasons. In the 
case of Brazil, the low growth trend and dramatic instability of her exports 
were associated with an extreme specialisation in a single export commodity, 
coffee. This is because the international demand for coffee grew slowly in 
comparison to other primary commodities during the period 1870-1930 while 
biological supply lags combined with a low price elasticity of supply generated 
cycles of 14 to 16 years length. In addition, a host of other domestic factors 
contributed to instability and lack of diversification in exports. Among these we 
find cases of market failure associated with compensatory exchange rate 
depreciation during periods of falling world coffee prices, the insufficient 
expansion of the domestic transportation network and the extreme dependence 
of both infrastructure investment and government finance on foreign 
investment. Therefore, any analysis which attributes the constraints of 
export-led growth in Brazil only to the international demand for primary 
products and the 'perverse' correlation between exports and foreign investment, 
in the spirit of the Prebish-ECLA view (e.g., Furtado, 1963), is one-sided. On 
the other hand, our analysis refutes claims that the market mechanism was 
efficient in stabilising export earnings before the post-1906 policy interventions 
(Delfim Netto, 1959). 
Exports had a major impact on domestic output via aggregate demand and 
relative price effects. Aggregate demand effects stemmed from the substantial 
backward and fiscal linkages to the coffee sector. On this count, the impact on 
domestic output was positive but relatively limited due to the slow long-term 
growth of coffee exports. At the same time, exports had an important bearing 
on real exchange rate determination and hence on the level of real protection 
for domestic industry. On this count, the impact on output growth was 
ambiguous: it was certainly unfavourable during sub-periods of rapid export 
growth - when exchange rate appreciation led to a major fall in real protection 
- whilst it was clearly favourable over periods of export downswings. Over the 
cycle, however, the level of real protection failed to display a significant 
upward trend through 1870-1930. In this context, it is not surprising that 
pressing demand for state intervention arose. The fact that the form of state 
intervention which came to prevail later had major negative repercussions on 
X-efficiency should not offset, however, a simple truth - namely, that the free 
working of the export and foreign exchange markets had failed to promote 
rapid and stable economic growth in Brazil. 
As regards Mexico, export-led growth failed for quite distinct reasons, which 
are largely ignored in the existing literature (Rosenzweig, 1960; Cardoso, 1980; 
Solis, 1985). Both the value and the quantum of Mexico's exports did not 
present any significant long-term fluctuations during 1870-1920 and, in fact, 
grew quite steadily when compared with other large primary producing 
economies such as Canada, Argentina and, especially, Brazil. The reasons for 
this phenomenon were then shown to be associated with both the diversified 
composition of Mexico's exports and the brisk international demand for mineral 
commodities abundantly available in the country. Moreover, a host of other 
domestic factors explain such a rapid export growth. Mexico operated a silver 
standard, so that the secular trend in the world price of silver from the 1870s 
onwards led to a corresponding exchange rate depreciation. This provided a 
major long-term boost to Mexico's exports. The rapid expansion of the railway 
services linking Mexico and its main export market (the USA), the worldwide 
rapid pace of technical progress in mining extraction and the dynamic role of 
US foreign capital further reinforced this trend. Only from the early 1920s 
onwards did the slowdown in the world demand for primary producing have an 
outstanding impact upon Mexico's exports, leading to a decline in their value 
and a stagnation of the exported volume. 
However, I have shown that, in contrast with Brazil, the export sector in 
Mexico was quite small and had limited linkages with the rest of the economy. 
The enclave nature of the Mexican export sector implied that export growth had 
a very limited impact on the macroeconomy and on industrialisation in 
particular. Political economy constraints prevented the state from playing an 
effective role in re-distributing the benefits of the rapid expansion of exports. 
To sum up, the failure of export-led growth in Brazil and Mexico cannot be 
simply attributed to asymmetries in international trade relations and to the 
instability of the world economy. On this ground, therefore, the argument for 
an interventionist policy with an anti-trade bias is weak. On the other hand, this 
paper has pointed out cases of market failures which prevented exports from 
being an efficient engine of growth in both countries. When left on their own, 
as they in fact were for most of the period, export markets fostered economic 
growth and industrialisation to only a very limited degree. This suggests that 
there was indeed much room for a strategic state intervention. This could have 
taken the form of a counter-cyclical tariff policy, higher taxes on enclave 
sectors and measures to foster export diversification towards products with 
greater domestic linkages. The fact that it did not happen is an open avenue for 
future research. In any case, these lessons from the pre-1930 development 
exp irience in Brazil and Mexico provide no support for straightforward views 
on the relationship between free trade, export expansion and overall economic 
growth. 
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Notes 
1. Data on real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) for Brazil between 
1870 and 1929 are from Contador and Haddad (1975). Note that the upper-bond 
figure of 1.2% is probably an overestimate since the Contador-Haddad data do 
not take into account the sluggish growth of the huge domestic non-tradable 
sector. The respective growth rate figure for Mexico refers to the period 
1895-1929 and was computed with data from INEGI (1986). 
2. An indicator of this is the share of labour force in manufacturing. By 1930, 
only 10% of the Mexican labour force was engaged in manufacturing whereas 
in Brazil the census of 1940 points to a share of 7.5% (Keesing, 1969; 
Goldsmith, 1986, p. 7). Note that a participation share of about 10% had been 
achieved in the US a century earlier (US Department of Commerce, 1975, p. 
139). Another indicator of the limited industrialization in the two countries is the 
size of their capital goods industries. In Mexico, the domestic supply of capital 
goods accounted for only 5.7% of the value added of industry and met only 
21.3% of the domestic demand for capital goods in 1929 (Cardenas, 1987, p. 
116). In Brazil, the respective figures are 4.9% of and 27%, according the 
census of 1939 (Fishlow, 1972, p. 334; Malan et al, 1977, p. 518). 
3. There exist regional case studies about the production of certain export crops 
such as sugar in the state of Pernambuco (Eisenberg, 1974) and rubber in the 
Amazon (Santos, 1980; Dean, 1989), but they do not provide an extensive 
economic analysis of determinants of the exports of these commodities. 
4. It can be shown that these variations are statistically significant (Catao, 
1991). 
5. All the long-term growth measures reported here are taken on a peak-to-peak 
basis, so as to be neutral to the business cycle in each country. The respective 
growth rates for Argentina's and Canada's exports were computed based on data 
from Lewis (1978) and Mitchell (1983). The figures for 1873-1913 are measured 
in gold, whereas the figures for 1913-28 are in US dollars. Argentina's exports 
were converted into US$ paper according to the paper peso-US$ parity provided 
in Diaz-Alejandro (1970, p. 484). Australian exports for 1873-1913 were not 
considered here due to the exclusion of western Australia in the official statistics 
prior to 1891 (see Mitchell, 1983, p. 616, fn. 30). 
6. This was due to supply lags and compensatory movements in the exchange 
rate, as will be discussed in section II. 1. 
7. Argentine data from Diaz-Alejandro (1970, p. 5) and Di Telia and Zymelman 
(1967, p. 78). Figures for Canada are from Maddison (1982, pp. 248-50). 
8. Due to a lack of data for some years in the 1870s, a continuous annual series 
on Mexico's exports is not available before 1878. 
9. Such a continuity is also supported by t-tests which reject the existence of 
trend variations before 1913 (Catao, 1991). 
10. Another standard measure of instability - the R2 of regressing exports on 
an exponential trend - point to the same direction: such a R2 for Mexico is 0.96, 
whereas the respective R2s for Argentina, Canada and Brazil, stand at 0.95, 0.89 
and 0.83. 
11. In spite of the rapid rise of German and French demand for Brazilian coffee 
during 1870-1913, the US was absorbing nearly 60% of Brazil's coffee exports 
by the early 1900s (Brazil, 1908-9, p. 102). 
12. For a detailed description of US output growth trends, see Solomou (1987, 
ch. 3). 
13. For the case of the arabica species, the one most cultivated in the western 
hemisphere. In the case of the robusta variety, the supply lag is about two years. 
However, the robusta specie should not concern us since its worldwide 
consumption was unimportant before the 1940s (Ford, 1978.a, p. 38-9). 
14. In fact, the longevity of the coffee tree varies across regions, depending on 
climate, soil conditions and treatment (Laerne, 1885, p. 293-6), but something 
like thirty to forty years is representative. 
15. The choice of i=5 instead of i=4 as the starting point of the coffee tree 
production cycle was based on the inspection of the correlogram of the world 
coffee price during the period 1870-1913. A high correlation between pt and pt_5 
also shows up in Parikh (1974), dealing with the 1950-68 period. 
16. Under the assumption of constant or slowly growing agricultural wages -
as was the case in pre-World War II Brazil (Hall, 1969) - this function implies 
that investment is a function of profits. 
17. More complex models of expectation formation could of course be devised 
but the simplicity of the assumption of static expectations outweighs possible 
gains in technical sophistication on this point. Our purpose here is to focus on 
the effects of biological production lags rather than on lags associated with the 
process of expectation formation. 
18. The effect of tariffs upon the consumer price can be neglected. Since none 
of the core countries was a coffee producer, Brazilian coffee was imported free 
of duty. As to Brazilian taxes on coffee exports, they were minimal and so need 
not be considered either. 
19. Such a simplified assumption is adopted by Delfim Netto (1959, pp. 152-3). 
In a similar vein, econometric works dealing with the post-World War II period 
have represented the productivity curve of the coffee tree by an exponential 
trend (Ford, 1978a and b). 
20. To see this algebraically, let Ao rl (cos w0t + £0) be the homogeneous 
solution of Equation 7 that represents oscillations of a long-swing periodicity 
and A, rl (cos w,t + £,) be the particular solution that describes the demand 
impulses stemming from the core countries. Beginning from the same starting 
point (£0~£i) and having the same periodicity (w0=w,), these cycles add to each 
other so as to give the final solution rl(A0 + A,)(cos w,t + £,), where A0= 
Pc^cos £0 and A,= Yo/cos £,. If the 'demand generated' cycle has a slightly 
different periodicity from the 'supply generated' cycle, e.g., one has a 18-year 
period and the other 15-year period, the resulting cycle will have a period 
between 15 and 18 years, depending on the relative amplitudes given by A, and 
A2. Note that the resulting phase hinges on the assumption of the exogeneity of 
the fluctuations in the core countries' real income. Otherwise we would have a 
case of dynamic coupling (Goodwin, 1947; 1985). However, the exogeneity 
assumption is clearly warranted in our case, since world coffee output accounts 
for a rather small share of the world total production. 
21. Estimated based on the FOB-CIF ratio of total Brazilian exports minus 2% 
relative to brokerage, commissions and insurance charges, as specified in 
Gongalves (1982, pp. 43 and 50). 
22. Whereas the coefficient of variation for coffee prices was 1.34 during 
1870-1913, that of the freight ratio was 0.012. 
23. According to Tauney's (1939, pp. 405-6) estimates, rail freights were six 
times lower than the rates charged by muleteers. No evidence on the price of 
coastal shipment services is available, but it was certainly much higher than that 
of railways. Given that as late as the mid-1900s transportation costs by rail from 
the coffee hinterland to one of the country's main port - Santos - averaged 
some 20% of the coffee FOB price (Brazil, 1908-09, pp. 91-92), it is clear that 
reduction in domestic transportation costs brought about by railways greatly 
increased the producers' profit margins. 
24. Computed on data from Mitchell (1983). 
25. Based on the following data sources: US real GDP from Maddison (1982, 
pp. 32-5), mil-reis/US$ exchange rate from Catao (1991, appendix IV), railway 
mileage from IBGE (1987, p. 411) and US$ coffee price from Delfim-Netto 
(1959, pp. 245-6). 
26. Here I am accepting the hypothesis that variations in US real GDP explains 
the world price of coffee at a statistical level between 5% and 10% (one-tailed 
test). This is in line with the growth rate evidence on the correlation between 
coffee price and US GDP over long-swing phases (table 7) as well as with the 
fact that when the US GDP variable is dropped from the above equation, the 
latter displays a lower adjusted R2 and auto-correlation problems. 
27. Data on the stock of coffee trees in Brazil's most important coffee state -
Sao Paulo - are from Fritsch (1988, p. 184). 
28. Furthermore, the coffee valorisation policies had two deleterious side-
effects: first, that of distorting domestic relative prices, thus hindering export 
diversification; secondly, they stimulated overseas competition, thereby reducing 
Brazil's share in world coffee trade (Delfim Netto, 1959; Furtado, 1963). 
29. On the causes of this slowdown, see Lewis (1949, pp. 149-56 and 184-6) 
and Kindleberger (1986, pp. 74-94). 
30. As regards the effect of American tariff policies on Mexico's silver exports, 
they were nil before the McKinley tariff (1890) and even thereafter do not seem 
to have been significant either (Bernstein, 1965, p. 37). 
31. During the 1920s, Mexico accounted for 35% to 45% of world silver 
production (del Cueto, 1959, p. 344). The USA was the second largest world 
producer. Her silver output rose from 1758 to 1893 cubic metres between 1920 
and 1929, whereas Mexico's rose from 2069 to 3386m3 over the same period 
(Mitchell, 1983, pp. 438-9). 
32. Although the quantum of sisal exports appears to be highly correlated with 
the US agricultural output during 1870-1920 (r=0.94), the former presents a 
much higher coefficient of variation than the latter (29.8 v. 0.82). This suggests 
that the bulk of the imbalance between demand and supply was adjusted through 
price variations. If the period 1870-1940 is taken as whole, the respective 
coefficient of correlation falls to 0.75. This points to the existence of important 
structural changes in the demand for Mexican sisal during from World War I 
onwards, as will be discussed below. 
33. Although Mexico had a monopolist position in the world market for 
henequen until World War I, her producers never managed to hold henequen off 
the market for a prolonged period so as to boost prices (Wells, 1985, p. 142). 
Wells (1985, pp. 50-55) finds some evidence that the increasing monopolistic 
control of the henequen trade by American importers after 1902 contributed to 
the decline in henequen prices during the 1900s. However, this view has not 
gone unchallenged (Joseph, 1986: 90-1). In fact, the evidence presented above 
suggests that such a monopolistic control had a minor impact on henequen prices 
in comparison with other long-term influences, such as the rise in planting 
during the late 1890s, the effect of the Phillipines war in 1898-1902, and the 
downturn in US agricultural production between 1906 and 1912. To be sure, 
world henequen prices in US$ (not the price in pesos - which was subject to 
variations in Mexico's exchange rate) remained high until 1905, instead of 
declining after 1902, as suggested by Wells's analysis of monopolistic 
influences. 
34. Only during 1897-1902 did long-term fluctuations in output and prices 
coincide. This was due to the effect of the Philippines War of 1898. The latter 
reduced dramatically the overseas supply of the manilla fibre - a close substitute 
for henequen, which led to an abnormal spurt in henequen prices. 
35. There existed natural constraints to the development of other cultures in 
henequen producing areas: soils were rocky, with an almost total lack of surface 
water (Wells, 1985, p. 16). At the same time, minimum profits warranted by low 
land and labour costs stimulated the henequen planter to expand cultivation 
irrespective of the price of the fibre (Wells, 1985, pp. 64-65). This tendency was 
partly counteracted by the fa&in foreign lending during periods of low henequen 
prices. 
36. Both the lack of data on manilla prices and the smallness of the 1878-1914 
sample for a cycle of 7 to 8 year length, has limited the use of econometrics 
here. In fact, a reduced form econometric estimation of henequen prices was 
attempted and although both US agricultural output and the domestic henequen 
price variables proved to be significant as expected, persistent first-order 
autocorrelation rendered such estimates invalid. 
37. Insofar as the latter led to a reduction in the US grain production and 
exports. 
38. Recent research has shown that, although revolutionary forces occupied the 
henequen state of Yucatan in 1915, this had little effect on the henequen 
business, which continued to prosper (Wells, 1985, pp. 67-88). 
39. This is because the bulk of Mexico's coffee was raised in the southern state 
of Chiapas, far away from the revolutionary fighting that took place in Central 
Mexico. 
40. The DW-statistics and the ADF-test for residual stationarity in this context 
are testing whether the two variables are co-integrated, i.e. whether they have 
common long-term trends. The DW statistics for both equations and the ADF 
for the copper equation support the co-integration hypothesis at a 5% level, 
whereas the ADF-test for the lead equation support co-integration at a 10% 
level. For a more detailed discussion of the concept of co-integration, see 
Dolado and Jenkinson (1987). Since the price variables are exogenous 
(internationally determined by the price of lead, copper and the peso exchange 
rate), their respective coefficients can be interpreted as long-term elasticities. 
Estimation was limited to the pre-1915 years due to a lack of exchange rate data 
for the years 1915 and 1916. 
41. The reasons for the phenomenon are as follows: i) copper and lead mines 
were located in Northern states, far from central Mexico, where the bulk of the 
revolutionary fighting took place; ii) any negative impact of the latter was 
probably offset by the sharp depreciation of the peso in the wake of the 
monetary disorder of 1914-17; iii) the revolution may even have contributed to 
enhance productive efficiency by eliminating small, less productive firms which, 
according to Bernstein (1965, p. 105), were the main victims of the fighting in 
the northern producing areas; iv) finally, a negative expectational effect upon 
new investment in the sector - so much stressed in the current literature (e.g. 
Solfs, 1985) - does not appear to have been specially significant. This 
hypothesis is supported in the words of a director of a large US mining firm 
operating in Mexico during the period: 'Disorder consequently suits us; mining 
claims are cheap, competition scarce' (as quoted in Bernstein, 1965, p. 105). 
42. By the 1937 peak the value of Mexico's oil exports was only one-fifth of 
its 1922 (peak) value. This corresponds to an annual geometric growth of 
-10.16%. 
43. Contrasting with manufacturing and mining (Haber, 1989; Bernstein, 1965), 
the transport sector was adversely affected by the revolutionary disruptions and 
did not begin to grow again until the early 1920s (Cardenas, 1982, pp. 159-60). 
44. Rising taxation should also be discarded as a possible cause of this 
downturn. For the tax burden on the total value of oil production actually fell 
from 24.5% in 1922 to 12.2% in 1927 (based on data from Krauze et al, 1977, 
p. 242). 
45. The so-called 'rate of return of exports'. It can be obtained by summing all 
the local expenditures of the export sector or by subtracting from exports the 
amount of imported inputs and profit/interest remittances. For an application of 
this concept to the cases of Peru and Chile, see Thorp and Bertham (1977) and 
Palma (1979), respectively. 
46. Furtado (1963) recognises the importance of the backward linkages of the 
coffee sector in Brazil, but his analysis overlooks the linkages between export 
growth and domestic industrialisation before the 1930s and lacks more 
supportive empirical evidence. More recently, some studies have drawn attention 
to the substantial positive impact of export growth on domestic industrial 
production (Dean, 1975; Suzigan, 1984), but without going into the 
microeconomics of this process. On Mexico, the only systematic analysis of the 
backward linkages of the export sector is due to Cardenas (1987). His analysis 
is limited to the mid-1920s/early 1930s, so that it does not take into 
consideration structural changes in the composition of exports and in the 
backward linkages of the export sector before then. Moreover, an analysis of the 
backward linkages of the agricultural export sector is missing in his work and 
the importance of the fiscal linkage is exaggerated, as will be shown later. 
47. Hirschman (1958) also emphasises the stimulus brought about by political 
or development strategies. These, however, do not concern us here for at least 
three reasons. First, because the size of the Brazilian and the Mexican state was 
relatively small during the period 1870-1930, only rising significantly after then. 
Secondly, policy-making in these countries was subject to severe fiscal and 
monetary constraints during the period, some of which will be pointed out later 
in this section. Thirdly, there exists a consensus in the literature that both Brazil 
and Mexico lacked a consistent industrial policy before the 1940s (Suzigan, 
1986; Barros and Graham, 1981; Soil's, 1985; Haber, 1989). 
48. This includes cases where the processing operation is currently 
uneconomical but may eventually lead to economies of scale and then to lower 
costs. 
49. A study of Sao Paulo coffee plantations in 1952 points out the dominance 
of cultivation and harvest methods being essentially the same as in the 
nineteenth century, with the hoe and the manual winnowing tray still being the 
standard implements (Holloway, 1980, p. 31). 
50. The impact of employment in the coffee sector on the rest of the economy 
can be seen clearly when one notes that coffee accounted for about 25% to 45% 
of the value added in agriculture during 1900-29 (estimated based on Haddad, 
1978, p. 56 and 154). 
51. The frugality and the concern with accumulating savings of the immigrant 
worker were well emphasised by contemporary observers (Hall, 1969, p. 141; 
Holloway, 1980, p. 141). 
52. With reference to the pre-1920 period, the share of land owned by Brazilian 
nationals in the country as a whole was probably higher. This is suggested by 
the land survey of 1904-5 for Sao Paulo. The latter, although it does not contain 
data on ownership by area of cultivated land, shows that 85.2% of all the rural 
properties in that state belonged to Brazilian nationals (Holloway, 1980, p. 149). 
53. In Argentina, for example, most landlords appear to have lacked 
entrepreneurial spirit and showed little interest in industry. The bulk of their 
astronomic earnings stemming from the extraordinarily fertile land of the 
'Pampas' was used up to finance imports of sophisticated consumption goods 
(Diaz-Alejandro, 1970, pp. 57, 158, 214-15). A similar story is told about 
Chilean agricultural exporters, with their 'natural disposition to rest, tranquility 
and luxury' (Palma, 1979, pp. 186-90). 
54. Dean (1975, p. 37), for instance, notes that the largest industrial employer 
in Sao Paulo was the planter-owned Paulista Railroad. Its repair shops with 703 
employees in 1896 made railway carriages and by 1911 entire locomotives were 
being assembled there, substituting imports. 
The entrepreneurial spirit shown by the coffee planters was not exclusive to this 
sector, but also manifested itself in the activities of the cotton exporters in the 
1860s and early 1870s (Canabrava, 1951; Stein, 1957, p. 22) as well as from the 
1930s onwards (Pelaez, 1971), when a dramatic shift in relative prices turned 
cotton growing into a highly profitable business. Yet in other coffee planting 
states, such as Minas and Rio, capital accumulated in coffee planting did not 
play a significant role in stimulating industrial ventures (Suzigan, 1986, pp. 
132-3). 
55. An illustration of the underdeveloped stage of the Brazilian manufacturing 
sector during the period is provided in Fishlow (1972). His computations 
indicate that, as late as 1919 and 1939, the domestic supply of capital goods 
accounted for only 1.5% and 4.2% of the domestic industrial output, respectively 
(Fishlow, 1972, p. 323 and 334). 
56. How much of this demand was met by domestic production rather than by 
imports was a function of relative prices. 
57. For estimates of the total investment/GDP ratio, see Goldsmith (1986, pp. 
64, 88, 150-153). 
58. This was computed using the 1919 agricultural census, Haddad's industrial 
production figures (1978, pp. 121-138) and estimates of the sectoral composition 
of the GDP for 1918-22 from Goldsmith (1986, p. 148). This share may be even 
higher for the pre-1900 period, but the absence of production data for the 19th 
century does not allow us to estimate it. 
59. This measure consists of dividing the domestic price of imports (including 
the tariff surcharge) by an index of domestic wholesale prices, i.e., real 
protection = Pm*E (l+t)/Pw. Data on these variables are from IBGE (1987), 
Suzigan (1986) and Catao (1992), respectively. 
60. See Catao (1991) for more extensive measures and details of measurement 
methods and their limitations. 
61. Contador and Haddad (1975) and Haddad (1980). 
62. For an extensive discussion of this point, see Furtado (1963), Versiani 
(1979), Franco (1983), and Catao (1991). 
63. See Ford (1962) for a classic account of such asymmetries. 
64. The high capital-intensive nature of the processing operation can be inferred 
from the following productivity figures: an average worker in extraction 
activities produced 111 constant pesos in 1900, whereas an average worker in 
processing activities produced 3,304 pesos. The respective figures for 1907 are 
1,327 and 5,235 pesos, respectively (Nava Oteo, 1965, p. 271). 
65. Based on census data from Mexico, Secretaria de Economia Nacional 
(1933, vol. III/2, p. 196). 
66. Among these, the importance of the railway system appears to have been 
outstanding. As Bernstein (1965, p. 33) notes: 'Smelters are completely 
dependent upon the railroads. Large central plants were not constructed until 
after the railway network was completed'. 
67. The processing of minerals such as copper and silver brings about a 
substantial reduction in their weight by removing impurities. Therefore, the 
closer the producer is to the consumer markets, the smaller the stimulus to 
process the mineral locally. In the case of Chile, for example, the relatively high 
transportation costs of shipping unrefined copper led to a considerable expansion 
of domestic foundries in the mid-nineteenth century (Palma, 1979, pp. 77-80). 
68. Although in geographic terms Mexico is a large country, skewed income 
distribution and high transportation costs led to a segmentation of the domestic 
market for intermediate goods. 
69. Computed with data from Krauze et al (1977). 
70. Based on data from Mexico (1933, Secretaria de Economia Nacional, vol. 
1, p. 12). GDP data from Soil's (1985). 
71. It has been shown that, besides the number of producer goods firms 
catering for the domestic market having been low, these firms tended to operate 
with high installed capacity/output ratios due to the very limited size of the 
domestic market (Haber, 1989, pp. 27-43). The mining industry, in particular, 
used domestically produced oil as fuel in very limited amounts (Nava Oteo, 
1965, p. 293). Only in the late 1930s, did the rapid growth of domestic 
manufacturing and the nationalisation of the oil sector both lead to a 
considerable part of Mexico's mineral and oil production being diverted to 
domestic industry, possibly allowing them to have a more significant impact on 
the latter. There does not exist supportive evidence on the magnitude of this 
link. 
72. 78% and 90%, respectively, in the mid-1920s (Cardenas, 1987, p. 25). 
73. Except for 1930 due to the severity of the impact of the 1929 crisis upon 
Brazil's capacity to import and foreign capital inflows. 
74. These estimates exclude cattle production and exports. If the latter are taken 
into account, such a share is 19.4% for 1899-1900 and 27.5% for 1904-05. Data 
on agricultural crops for the periods before 1892 and 1908-1920 are missing, 
except for an estimate of agricultural output in the 1877-78 fiscal year which is 
quite unreliable (Coatsworth, 1976). 
75. Although the precise extent of the market control by International Harvester 
during 1902-1915 is debatable (Joseph, 1986, pp. 81-91), it was certainly large 
enough for this firm to be able to reap bulky extra-profits. 
76. In this sense, Cardenas's emphasis (1987, ch. 1) on the macroeconomic 
importance of this sort of fiscal linkage from the 1920s onwards is misleading. 
His argument is based on the share of the petroleum industry's surplus taken by 
the government via direct taxation, when the relevant indicator is the relative 
contribution of taxation on mineral activities to overall government revenues. 
77. Ministerio del Fomento, 'Tariff Laws of Mexico'; several years. 
78. Averaging 7.7% per annum between 1925 and 1940. 
79. Leakages associated with public foreign debt service are not discount due 
to the lack of data on this count. However, until 1886 and for most of the 
1910-1937 period, these leakages were non-existent since the country's foreign 
debt repayment was in arrears. 
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